Changing Prison Management Strategies in Response to VOI/TIS Legislation by Turner, Susan et al.
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Criminology and Criminal Justice Faculty
Publications and Presentations Criminology and Criminal Justice
12-2001
Changing Prison Management Strategies in Response to VOI/TIS
Legislation
Susan Turner
Laura J. Hickman
Portland State University
Judith Greene
Terry Fain
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/ccj_fac
Part of the Criminology Commons, and the Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance
Commons
This Technical Report is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Criminology and Criminal Justice Faculty
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Citation Details
Hickman, Laura J., Judith Greene, Terry Fain, Rand Corporation, and United States of America. Changing Prison Management
Strategies in Response to VOI/TIS Legislation. Rand., 2001. Publication number DRU-2721-NIJ
The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S.
Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:
Document Title: Changing Prison Management: Strategies in
Response to VOI/TIS Legislation
Author(s): Susan Turner ; Laura J. Hickman ; Judith
Greene ; Terry Fain
Document No.:   198622
Date Received: January 2003
Award Number: 98-CE-VX-0023
This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice.
To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally-
funded grant final report available electronically in addition to
traditional paper copies.
Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the official position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
Changing Prison 
Management Strategies in 
Response to VOIDIS 
Leg is 1 at ion 
Susan Turner, Laura J. Hickman, Judith Green(?, 
and Tlerry Fain 
DR U-2 721 -NIJ 
December 2001 
Prepared for the National Institute of Justice 
Criminal Justice Program 
The RAND unrestricted draft series is intended to transmit 
results of RAND research. This draft has not been formally re- 
viewed by the RAND quality assurance process. However, it 
has been reviewed by the client and revised in light of the 
reviews. This version is suitable for transmission to the 
National Criminal Justice Reference Service. 
RRND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. 
The research described in this report was supported by grant #96-CE-VX-O023from the National Institute of Justice, with funds transferred-frum the 
Corrections Program Office, Ofice of Justice Programs, United States Deparfnzenf uf Justice. Points of view are those of the authors and do not 
- - I : - : - -  - ~ - * l - -  h r - L l ' - - n l  l e r C : t , r t o  04 Lrrat;rp nl thp cnmp&ovq proprnm ()ff,-o - - . P,-. . , ., . 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
PREFACE 
The Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 
as amended, provided for federal Violent-Offender Incarceration and 
Truth-in-Sentencing (VOI/TIS) incentive grants to the states and U.S. 
territories. These grants are to be used to increase the capacity of 
state correctional systems to confine serious and violent offenders. 
Congress and the U.S. Department of Justice agreed to devote some of the 
committed funds intended for these grants to evaluating the actions they 
support. This evaluation addresses the impacts of recent sentencing 
practices on changes in correctional management and the expanded use of 
privatization, as a complement to RAND'S national evaluation of the 
implementation and early outcomes of VOI/TIS incentive grants to states. 
RANDls evaluation tracked and documented changes in sentencing 
changes, classification, health care, programming, professionalism of 
correctional employees, and costs. Information on prison management was 
collected at a national level and through state-level case studies in 
seven states (California, Florida, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Texas, and Washington). In addition, detailed case studies of 
privatization were conducted in three of the seven prison management 
case study states--Florida, North Carolina, and Texas. 
This report is one in a series of RAND studies on the impact of 
truth-in-sentencing and other "get tough" policies on state and local 
corrections. Other reports for interested readers include: 
Susan Turner, Terry Fain, Peter W. Greenwood, Elsa Chen, and James 
Chiesa, with Stella Bart, Judith Greene, Daniel Krislov, Eric Larson, 
Nancy Merritt, and Albert Hyun Yoon (20011, National Evaluation of the 
Viol en t offender Incarcera tion/Truth - i n  - Sent encing Incentive Grant 
Program, DRU-2634-NIJI Final Report to the National Institute of 
Justice. 
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SUMMARY 
I t  
INTRODUCTION 
Across the nation, states are joining the growing movement to !!get 
tough1' on crime and criminals. Three-strikes, mandatory minimums, and 
Truth-in-Sentencing legislation are all attempts to keep serious 
offenders in prison for longer periods (of time and promote public 
safety. Most generally, Truth-in-Sentencing refers to the requirement 
that offenders serve a substantial portion of their imposed prison 
sentence. This is in contrast to correctional policies that allow for 
release of offenders before they have served their full court-imposed 
sentence. Truth-in-Sentencing laws are intended to both deter offenders 
from committing crime and help restore the credibility of the criminal 
justice system in the eyes of the public. 
The Federal government recently launched an effort to encourage 
states to adopt Truth-in-Sentencing and other forms of "get tough" 
legislation. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 
as amended, provided for Federal Violen1:-Offender Incarceration and 
Truth-in-Sentencing (VOI/TIS) incentive grants to the states. This 
legislation was largely designed to increase the capacity of state 
correctional systems to confine serious and violent offenders for longer 
periods of time and to assure the public that these offenders would 
serve a substantial portion of their sentences (Office of Justice 
Programs 1996). Specifically, the purposes of the VOI/TIS incentive 
grants are to provide states with funds to: 
0 Build or expand bed capacity in correctional facilities for 
confinement of offenders convicted of a Part 1 violent crimes 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
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or juveniles adjudicated for acts which, if committed by an 
adult, would constitute a Part 1 violent crime1 
0 Build or expand temporary or permanent correctional facilities, 
including facilities on military bases, prison barges, and boot 
camps, to house convicted nonviolent offenders and criminal 
aliens, for the purpose of freeing up existing prison space for 
offenders convicted of Part 1 violent crime 
I 
I 
, 
0 Build or expand local jail capacity2 
VOI/TIS INCENTIVE GRANTS 
A state may apply for TIS grants by meeting one of two criteria: 
0 It has implemented laws requiring convicted violent offenders 
to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence or resulting in 
such offenders serving on average 85 percent of their sentence 
0 It has enacted a law providing that within three years of its 
grant application it will require convicted violent offenders 
to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence 
The percentage of the total TIS funds that each state is allocated 
for a given year is equal to the percentage of the nation's violent 
crimes committed in that state over the three years preceding the 
allocation. The grant is thus both merit- and need-based, because all 
states need to show statutory or de facto 85 percent truth in 
sentencing, but their amount of funding is contingent on "need" for 
federal assistance to combat violent crime. 
For VOI funding, a state need only give assurances that it has 
implemented or will implement policies ensuring that 
Part 1 violent crimes are defined by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation as murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, 
and aggravated assault (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2000). 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
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I 
0 violent offenders serve "a substantial portion" of their 
sentences 
0 their punishment is Ilsuf f iciently severe" 
0 the time served is "appropriately related" to the violent- 
offender status and sufficient to protect the public 
I 
States meeting these criteria are said to be eligible for "Tier 118 
funding.3 A state can receive a greater share of VOI funding (Tier 2) 
if it can show that since 1993 it has increased any of the following: 
0 the percentage of convicted vicilent offenders that have been 
sentenced to prison 
0 the average time they have served 
0 the average percentage of their sentence they have served 
A state can also receive a greater share of VOI funding (Tier 3) 
if it can show it has accomplished either of the following: 
0 since 1993, increased the percentage of convicted violent 
offenders that have been sentenced to prison and the average 
percentage of their sentence they have served 
0 within the past three years, increased by at least 10 percent 
the number of convicted violent offenders committed by the 
courts to prison 
RAND recently completed a national evaluation of the 
implementation and early outcome experiences of the VOI/TIS incentive 
CPO 1999 Application Kit, p. 2. 
3This terminology has been adopted .in implementing the Act; it is 
not present in the Act itself. 
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grant program (see Turner et at. 2001). The current study was designed 
to complement the national evaluation, examining adaptations in prison 
management made by state correctional agencies in response to VOI/TIS. 
Specifically, the current study addresses the following research 
questions : 
What management changes have been made by state correctional 
agencies in order to deal with the increase in the numbers of 
violent offenders being incarcerated, many for much longer 
periods than in the past? 
0 What additional safety and training procedures have been 
instituted for correctional staff in order to deal with the 
increase in violent offenders? 
0 HOW does the increase in vio1en.t offenders affect the type and 
extent of programming (e.g., education, prison employment) 
health care and safety procedures? 
0 What types of offenders, programs, or services fall within 
private corrections? What has been the experience of private 
corrections in terms of inmate and officer safety, infractions, 
accountability and costs? 
METHODOLOGY 
The current study answers these questions using a three-tiered 
methodology. Nationwide characteristics on prison management were 
gathered for all states. Case studies on prison management were 
conducted for seven states (California, Florida, New York, North 
Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington). Detailed case studies, that 
included site visits, were conducted on issues related to privatization 
in three of the seven states--Texas, North Carolina, and Florida. 
For purposes of the present analyses, TIS classification is based 
on funding, not on whether the state passed T I S  legislation--although 
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all but three of the states that received TIS funding also passed 
qualifying TIS legislation. New Mexico, Wisconsin, and the District of 
Columbia were not included as TIS states in analyses, since they enacted 
TIS later than the most recently available data. We separate out Texas, 
since its effect--particularly for quantitative measures of crime and 
sentences--swamps the effects of other non-TIS states. 
I FINDINGS 
Limitations of the Current Study , 
Like our national evaluation of the implementation and early 
outcomes of VOI/TIS on crime rates, prison sentences, admissions, and 
time served (see Turner et al. 20011, the current evaluation also 
operated under several constraints. 
First, our evaluation was conducted early in the implementation of 
VOI/TIS; the full impact of VOI/TIS will not be seen until years from 
now. States do not have to spend VOI/TIS funds during the year in which 
they are received--states have up to four years from the year in which 
funds are awarded. Thus states have not yet built all the beds 
originally envisioned for VOI/TIS offenders. In addition, the impact of 
TIS legislation will not be felt until violent offenders begin to serve 
the portions of their sentences that are beyond that which was 
historically served. Second, although we can examine the differential 
effects of states that did and did not receive TIS funding, we cannot 
determine the impact of VOI/TIS funds overall. This is because all 
states received funding from the program. We do not have a set of 
states, for comparison purposes, that dil5 not participate in the VOI/TIS 
program. Thus, changes we observe over time may be due to other events, 
sentencing changes, or national trends nl>t associated with VOI/TIS. 
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National Analyses of Prison Management Tregds 
I 
Overall, our national analyses suggest one of two patterns. 
Changes in some measures have been occurring over the past decade and 
Some measures have remained fairly constant. We do not observe sharp 
changes for TIS states about the time of many states were passing TIS 
legislation in 1994. In some instances, TIS states show higher levels 
of prison management concerns (such as percent of inmates at high/close 
custody, misconduct reports) , but for other variabies, non-TIS states 
show higher levels (such as inmate assaults). We did not find strong 
evidence for our hypotheses regarding the potential impact of TIS on 
prison management variables. 
Averaging over states in these analyses may mask important state level 
experiences. In addition, data are available only during the first 
several years after TIS legislation was passed in many states. As we 
found in our national VOI/TIS evaluation, we may need to wait several 
more years in order to gauge the impact of such sentencing policies. 
This may be due to several reasons. 
Prison Management Case Study Interviews 
Based on our case study interviews, it appears the VOI/TIS and 
other get tough policies have had at least some impact on prison 
management within individual states. Most of our interviewees reported 
longer sentences, greater numbers of older inmates, and increased 
crowding. These conditions were not unanimously considered a direct 
result of VOI/TIS, but were often considered the result of a rising 
prison population, to which VOI/TIS has contributed. One consistent 
theme was the anticipation that VOI/TIS and other get tough policies 
would have an impact on prison management in the future. TIS and other 
changes in sentencing policy are relatively new and most of our 
respondents expect greater impact, in terms of crowding, aging inmates, 
and costs, will be observed as more inmates are sentenced under the new 
policies. 
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Privatization Case Studies 
The privatization case studies were designed to examine and 
document management practices in state lcorrectional systems with more 
than a few years of experience with prison privatization, and to explore 
whether the provisions of VOI/TIS, or other elements of the movement 
promoting "get tough" legislation have (affected how states approach the 
issue of privatization. 
For more than fifteen years private prison marketing efforts have 
been built on assertions that they could deliver higher quality services 
at a lower price than public correctional agencies. The public debates 
about whether a state should include prison privatization among the 
approaches taken to improve or expand the correctional system are 
usually couched in terms of correctiona:l costs and efficiency, but the 
evidence to date does not offer solid support for the claims made by 
proponents. There are other factors, however, that underlie and 
influence the decision process. 
The decision to privatize prison operations is ultimately made in 
the political arena, by legislators and governors and not by a state's 
professional correctional managers. 
history of this industry, all states have faced huge increases in their 
prison populations but fewer than half have chosen to address this 
Over the course of the fifteen-year 
problem by contracting with private companies to build or manage state 
prisons within their political boundaries.4 
traditions and the political cultures appear to play a predominant role 
Regional political 
in determining whether a state will move to privatize its prisons. 
example, almost all of the early contracts were for facilities built and 
operated in traditionally conservative lllright-to-workll states, where 
For 
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correctional labor unions are weak or non-existent, and strong 
bi-partisan support for private prisons prevailed. 
"get tought1 measures that have been incorporated in a state's criminal 
justice policies and practices do not appear to play a major role. 
Specific VOI/TIS or 
Our case studies show that private management of prisons is often 
associated with specific patterns of shortcomings and deficiencies 
(e.g., higher rates of staff turnover, problems with classification and 
inmate discipline, deficient provision of basic selrvices, higher rates 
of violent assaults). Many of these problems can be traced to the 
primary objective of the industry: to reap profits from the high-risk 
business of operating prisons. Once the political decision to privatize 
is made, a state's correctional managers face a number of administrative 
challenges, as we discuss below. 
Considerations for Private Prisons. Given the strong financial 
incentives to cut costs in order maximize profits while remaining 
'fcompetitive," performance of private prison contractors becomes a key 
issue. Some have argued that the proper' role of public correctional 
management in these transactions should be to set high performance 
standards and outcome measures, and then to stand back and let the 
private sector "innovatel' its way toward1 more efficient ways to do 
business. Austin's review of the current state of private correctional 
practice, however, reveals scant evidence of innovation (Austin and 
Coventry 1999). 
from the public corrections systems. In Minnesota, private companies 
mimicked the public system in some ways, while failing to provide 
Private companies have often hired veteran managers 
required service delivery in a number of areas (Greene 2000). 
Many states-- e.g., New York and Illinois--have no involvement 
with prison privatization, though they may contract with for-profit 
vendors of community corrections, halfway houses and the like. Some 
states--e.g., Hawaii and Wisconsin--have sent prisoners to be confined 
in private prisons located elsewhere, but have not yet embraced the 
concept of privately-operated prisons within their borders. 
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Given this experience, public managers are wise to provide 
precisely detailed prescriptions for every aspect of prison operations 
I 
as they issue requests for proposals and negotiate contracts. A review 
of the experience with prison privatization in the three case-study 
states suggests that such administrative practices are essential to 
managing the risks and help to secure adequate levels of performance 
from private prison vendors. Specifica1,ly: 
I 
0 Clear and detailed specifications €or every aspect of prison 
operations need to be incorporated in "requests for proposalsv1 
f o r  private prison operation to establish comprehensive 
performance expectations and set an unambiguous framework for 
contracting, and for management oversight, monitoring, and 
enforcement of contract requirements. Contracts must 
incorporate a detailed, enforceable staffing plan, and should 
specify quantified performance measures €or delivery of 
security services, healthcare, and correctional programs. 
0 strict monitoring and enforcement are needed to enforce the 
terms of the contract. This requires daily onsite monitoring 
by a dedicated full-time experiienced corrections professional; 
careful documentation of operational deficiencies and problems; 
and enforcement sanctions with specific monetary sanctions 
(i.e., per diem adjustments) that will be triggered when 
explicit performance benchmarks are not met. 
A decade and a half of experience with privatization in the U.S. 
evokes a number of other cautionary principles for approaching 
correctional privatization: 
0 A jurisdiction cannot afford to privatize so large a proportion 
of institutional corrections that the system becomes dependent 
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on private management and cannot bargain to its best 
advantage--or finds itself unable to take over prison 
operations (or absorb the contracted population load) when 
things go wrong. The proportican of privatized prison 
operations in a jurisdiction should therefore remain quite low. 
For the same reason, jurisdictions choosing to privatize prison 
operations should maintain ownership of the facilities 
involved. This will help to avoid impediments to converting 
private prisons to public management if the costs of 
privatization (financial or political) prove to be too high. 
0 Jurisdictions should have clear and realistic objectives and 
expectations. The consensus among credible researchers is that 
the public cannot expect to obtain much, if any, tax-dollar 
savings through privatization. Adequate funding for security 
services and prison programs is essential. Vendors who propose 
per diems that appear (at least on paper) to produce 
substantial savings may be bidding deliberately and 
irresponsibly low. Politicians who make expansive claims of 
savings through privatization may be ignoring the inevitable 
hidden costs, such as increased complaints of improper 
treatment in private facilities. 
0 Jurisdictions should not contract for prison beds outside of 
their political boundaries, nor should they allow IIspec" 
prisons to be built or operated within them. The track record 
amassed by private prison operators that contract for 
out-of-state prisoners is poor. The logistics of monitoring 
and enforcing contracts for beds located hundreds or thousands 
of miles away are difficult. The lack of adequate local and 
state jurisdictional control over I'spec" prisons has given rise 
to a set of operational, legal, and political problems that 
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have not been sufficiently addressed by any host jurisdiction 
to date. I 
0 Private prison contractors should be required to pay prevailing 
wages and provide comparable benefit levels for private prison 
staff. At the time of our study, the strains placed by a 
strong economy on the correctional labor pool were affecting 
public prison systems adversely--especially in states like 
Texas, where the prison system expanded at a rate that has 
I 
I 
stripped an already tight labor market. Private prison , 
operators offering lower compensation for line staff than is 
afforded them by public correctional agencies (whether to 
effect savings or to increase profits) found it increasingly 
difficult to fill staff vacancies and cover key security posts. 
In many private prisons the result has been a security force 
that is under-qualified, insufficiently experienced, and 
exhausted though excessive, involuntary overtime. 
0 Given the patterns of structural deficiencies mentioned above, 
the best results with private prison operations may be achieved 
by limiting contractors to provision of housing and services 
for the least challenging prisoners. This means restricting 
the private market to relatively low-security prisoners who are 
not prone to violence, and who are nearing the end of their 
prison sentences and therefore have every incentive for good 
behavior. The track record is poor where public managers have 
not taken great care in selection of candidates for transfer to 
private prisons, or where vendors have been willing to accept 
prisoners beyond their management capacity. This has been 
especially true in instances where prisoner classification 
tools were defective or overridden by contingent circumstances, 
or where prisoners in need of expensive, individualized 
services (e.g., juvenile offendlers, mentally ill prisoners) 
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were transferred to private facilities that were not equipped 
to address their needs. 
I 
CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, our analyses suggest that VOI/TIS may not be having a 
major impact to date on prison management issues and privatization. 
Longer term historical trends have been impacting prison management over 
the past decade. The use of privatization has been very modest under 
VOI/TIS and may be related more to political than to administrative 
correctional decisions. 
Although our analyses did not reveal large impacts on prison 
management at the national level, it is possible to provide more precise 
information on several prison management topics at the 'individual state 
level. For example, by examining differences in offender participation 
in programming, inmate grievances, as well as assaults in states where 
porti.ons of similar inmates are sentenceid under TIS and non-TIS laws, we 
may be able to obtain a clearer impact of such policies. 
have been conducted in North Carolina (Memory et al. 1999) and currently 
being investigated by RAND using data from Washington State. 
Such analyses 
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I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTIONS 
Across the nation, states are joining the growing movement to "get 
/ I  
tough1# on crime and criminals. Three-strikes, mandatory minimums, and 
Truth-in-Sentencing legislation are all attempts to keep serious 
offenders in prison for longer periods of time and promote public 
safety. Most generally, Truth-in-Sentencing refers to the requirement 
that offenders serve a substantial portion of their imposed prison 
sentence. This is in contrast to correctional policies that allow for 
release of offenders before they have served their full court-imposed 
sentence. Truth-in-Sentencing laws are intended to both deter offenders 
from committing crime and help restore the credibility of the criminal 
justice system in the eyes of the public. 
The Federal government recently launched an effort to encourage 
states to adopt Truth-in-Sentencing and other forms of "get tough1# 
legislation. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 
as amended, provided for Federal violent-Offender Incarceration and 
Truth-in-Sentencing (VOI/TIS) grants to the states. This legislation 
was largely designed to increase the capacity of state correctional 
systems to confine serious and violent offenders for longer periods of 
time and to assure the public that these offenders would serve a 
substantial portion of their sentences (OJP 1996). Specifically, the 
purposes of the VOI/TIS incentive grants are to provide states with 
funds to: 
0 Build or expand bed capacity in correctional facilities.for 
confinement of offenders convicted of a Part 1 violent crimes 
Much of the information provided .in this chapter is taken from 
the national evaluation of VOI/TIS conducted by RAND (Turner et al. 
2001). 
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or juveniles adjudicated for acts which, if committed by an 
adult, would constitute a Part 1 violent crime6 
0 Build or expand temporary or permanent correctional facilities, 
including facilities on military bases, prison barges, and boot 
camps, to house convicted nonviolent offenders and criminal 
aliens, for the purpose of freeing up existing prison space for 
offenders convicted of Part 1 violent crime 
/ I  
0 Build or expand local jail capacity7 
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, as amended, 
authorized over $10 billion in Subtitle A funds for the years 1995 to 
2000. These funds were to be divided equally between two programs: 
Truth-in-Sentencing (TIS) Incentive Grants and Violent-Offender 
Incarceration (VOI) Grants. States could apply for and receive funding 
through either or both of these programs. 
ALLOCATION OF VOI/TIS FUNDS 
Between fiscal years 1996 and 1999, nearly two billion dollars 
were awarded to states under the VOI/TIS incentive grants program, with 
$927 million allocated under TIS and $920 million under VOI. 
states and the District of Columbia received TIS funding in at least one 
of these years. Not surprisingly, the largest total funding amounts 
under the VOI/TIS program have gone to the most populous states because 
Thirty 
the TIS funds disbursed are proportional to the total number of violent 
crimes. California has received the most funds to date--$289 million; 
New York and Florida have received over $150 million each. Eleven less 
populated states--Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Part 1 violent crimes are defined by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation as murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, 
and aggravated assault (FBI 2000). ’ CPO 1999 Application Kit, p. 2. 
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Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming--received less than $10 million each. 
I 
RAND recently completed a national evaluation of the 
implementation and early outcome experiences of the VOI/TIS incentive 
grant program (see Turner et at. 2001). The current study was designed 
to complement the national evaluation, examining adaptations in prison 
management made by state correctional agencies in response to VOI/TIS. 
Specifically, the current study addresses the following research 
questions : 
0 What management changes have been made by state correctional 
agencies in order to deal with the increase in the numbers of 
violent offenders being incarcerated, many for much longer 
periods than in the past? 
0 What additional safety and training procedures have been 
instituted for correctional sta,ff in order to deal with the 
violent offenders? 
0 How does the increase in violent offenders affect the type and 
extent of programming (e.g., education, prison employment) 
health care and safety procedures? 
0 What types of offenders, programs, or services fall within 
private corrections? What has been the experience of private 
corrections in terms of inmate and officer safety, infractions, 
accountability and costs? 
The current study answers these questions using a three-tiered 
methodology. Nationwide characteristics on prison management were 
gathered for all states; case studies on prison management were 
conducted for seven states (California, Florida, New York, North 
Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington). Detailed case studies on 
issues related to privatization that included site visits, were 
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conducted in three of the seven states--Texas, North Carolina, and 
Florida. 
We turn first to a review and discussion of prison management in 
/ I  
Chapter 11. Chapter I11 follows with a similar presentation for 
privatization. In Chapter IV, we discuss the potential impacts of 
VOI/TIS on prison management and privatization. Chapter V presents an 
overview of the research methodology. In Chapter VI, we present 
findings from our analysis of national trends; Chapter VI1 presents 
management findings from the seven case studies; in Chapter VIII, the 
three-state case study findings for privatization. Chapter IX presents 
the summary and conclusions. 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
I 
- 5 -  
11. REVIEW OF PRISON MANAGEMENT , 
At the aggregate level, VOI/TIS and related policies are likely to 
produce changes in the composition of correctional populations and alter 
management strategies and programs for incarcerated populations. 
Potential changes produced by VOI/TIS and other "get tough" sentencing 
policies notwithstanding, correctional management pas long been 
recognized as a challenging task. In addition to the general issues 
surrounding management of any large organization, correctional 
administrators face many unique responsibilities associated with the 
competing demands of incarceration. 
One of those responsibilities is to establish and maintain an 
organization consistent with the purpose of incarceration. This purpose 
determines the "services" to be delivered (or goals to be accomplished) 
by correctional managers. At different points in Amelrican history, the 
goal of incarceration has shifted in response to pressure from various 
social and legal movements. For most of the 19OOs, the primary 
correctional goal was the rehabilitation of inmates (Andrews et al. 
1990). The rehabilitation perspective seeks to change individual 
offenders in a way that prevents future criminality. As Martinson 
(1974) described it, the rehabilitation perspective views criminal 
behavior as a disease amenable to cure. Prisons were regarded as houses 
of "correction" and the institutional environment was thought to promote 
inmate remorse and reform. Indeterminate sentencing and the possibility 
for parole were thought to both encourage positive inmate behavior 
within the institution and allow prison officials the necessary 
flexibility to monitor the rehabilitative progress of individual 
inmates 
By the early to mid-1970s a number of influences, including the 
concerns raised by the Civil Rights and other social movements about 
discrimination by criminal justice officials, lead to criticism of the 
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Irehabilitation-oriented approach of correctional systems (Feely and 
Simon 1992). Reformers became concerned about the broad discretion 
authorities were afforded in managing inmate populations under an 
indeterminate sentencing structure. In addition, a high-profile review 
of available evidence on the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs 
called into question the efficacy of these programs (Martinson 1974), 
leading to the widespread sentiment that. "nothing workst1 (see Gendreau 
/ I  
and Ross 1987). 
These pressures contributed to a substantial change in the 
paradigm dominating corrections over the past twenty-five years. 
Correctional and sentencing policy shifted from a central focus on 
processing of individual cases to a concern with the standardization of 
sanctioning for all offenders (Feely and Simon 1992; Tonry and Hatlestad 
1997). Crime control policy has become highly politicized--leading to 
an increasing emphasis on incarceration as the primary response to both 
violent and nonviolent criminal behavior- (Blumstein 1995). Since 1980, 
all 50 states and the federal government. have established mandatory 
minimum terms of imprisonment for conviction of various types of crimes 
that might have otherwise resulted in a non-prison sentence or shorter 
term of incarceration (Tonry 1996). Data from the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics show that between 1980 and 15199, the number of state and 
federal prisoners grew from 329,821 to 3,344,369 (Beck 2000; Beck and 
Gilliard 1995). During the same time period, the incarceration rate 
(number of prisoners per 100,000 population) went from 9 to 20 for the 
federal population and 130 to 272 for state populations (Beck 2000; Beck 
and Gilliard 1995). 
Rather than an increase in offending activity, researchers have 
identified !'get tough" sanctioning policies as the primary explanation 
for this sizable increase in incarceration (Cohen and Canela-Cacho 
1994). In particular, policies related to sentencing for drug offenses 
have played a substantial role in the dramatic increase in imprisonment. 
Lengthy mandatory minimum prison sentences have become primary 
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ammunition of the Itwar on drugs," drawing large numbers of first-time 
offenders and low level drug dealers into prison populations at an 
unprecedented rate (Tonry 1995). The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
reports that between 1990 and 1998 drug offenders accounted for 19 
percent of the growth of sentenced state prisoners. Half of the total 
growth, however, was attributed to prisoners sentenced for violent 
crimes (Beck 2000). 
The increased use of incarceration means that correctional 
officials today must manage growing populations of inmates serving 
longer terms of incarceration. Prison administrators have been forced 
to focus increased attention on issues of cost control and the 
distribution of scarce resources, including living space, programming, 
and supervision by correctional officers (Feely and Simon 1992). The 
pressure on administrators to adapt to these constraints occurs within 
an organizational context already recognized for presenting unique 
challenges to management. Correctional institutions are facilities 
peopled by unwilling short- and very long-term residents who must be 
housed, fed, clothed, protected, monitored, and disciplined for 
disruptive and sometimes violent behavior. Under conditions where 
inmates often substantially outnumber staff, prison administrators 
require effective methods for maintaining order and control while 
protecting the Constitutional rights of inmates and safety of employees 
(Wright 1994). The increased reliance on incarceration can reasonably 
be expected to complicate this already difficult management situation. 
In the next sections, we discuss a number of correctional management 
issues in the context of prison population and policy changes, including 
good/gain time and parole, classification, health care, programming, 
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cost of corrections, professionalism of correctional employees, and 
crowding in correctional facilities.8 
EARLY RELEASE 
Two tools traditionally available to correctional administrators 
to assist in managing the complicated issues of inmate populations are 
behavioral incentives known as lpgood time” and parole. Good time, also 
called gain time, refers to credits inmates earn toward a sentence 
reduction in exchange for good behavior within the institution, Good 
behavior consists of following the rules of conduct, but may also 
include participation in rehabilitative and other programming (Weisburd 
and Chayet 1996). In the United States,, good time laws were adopted 
largely for the purpose of encouraging positive behavior (without the 
use of corporal punishment or solitary confinement), active 
participation in prison employment, and serving as an internal mechanism 
for relieving overcrowding (Parisi and Zillo 1983). 
Similarly, parole is thought to encourage positive, productive 
inmate behavior within correctional institutions. It was established as 
an important part of the rehabilitation model. Under parole systems, 
inmates who could demonstrate their rehabilitation and readiness for 
life in the community were eligible €or early release, at the discretion 
of a board of respected citizens and professionals. Like good time, 
parolle was intended to serve as a source of motivation for behavioral 
compliance and productivity but also provided a mechanism for relieving 
overcrowded conditions (Rhine 1996). O v e r  the past decade or more, a 
distinctly negative conception of parole has developed among politicians 
and the public, encouraged by several highly publicized crimes committed 
i 
* This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of all important 
correctional management issues. For example, judicial intervention in 
correctional facilities has produced sometimes quite radical change in 
the requirements placed on prison managers (Smith 2000). Discussion and 
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by parolees. This negative conception lead to what Petersilia (1999: 
479) refers to as "the most profound" of the criminal justice reforms 
undertaken in recent years. 
in the United States, Petersilia (1999) reports that presently only 15 
I 
In her review of parole and prison reentry 
states maintain traditional parole boards with full discretionary 
release authority. By 1998, 14 states had abolished parole and 21 had 
reduced the scope of authority of parole boards. 
CLASSIFICATION 
Another tool used by correctional officials to assist in 
accomplishing the complicated management task is inmate classification. 
Early forms of inmate classification consisted of the simple physical 
separation of women from men, juveniles from adults, and mentally ill 
inmates from others. These broad separations were performed largely for 
the protection of one category of inmate from another (Craddock 1993). 
Over the past century, classification schemes have become much more 
complex, expanded the number of factors employed in grouping decisions, 
and diversified in the types of inmate groups identified (Solomon and 
Camp 1993). 
The most prominent forms of classification are intended to 
separate inmates into groups according to security risk, such as the 
threat of escape from the facility, and custody requirements keferring 
to the level of danger posed by inmates to themselves, staff, and fellow 
inmates. This sorting assists prison managers in more effectively using 
available resources by placing more dangerous inmates under higher (and 
more expensive) levels of security and custody than less dangerous 
inmates (Craddock 1993). In addition, inmate classification has been 
used for other purposes including rehabilitative and medical need, 
identification of vulnerable inmates who require protection, and 
examination of judicial intervention in correctional systems, is complex 
and beyond the scope of this report. 
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managing disciplinary problems (Fernandez and Neiman 1998). 
Classification has become such an important mechanism for the protection 
and control of inmates that successful law suits have been brought 
against prison officials for failing to employ or properly use this 
management tool (Vaughn and del Carmen 1995). 
CROWDING 
Since the days of Philadelphia's Walnut Street Jail two centuries 
ago, American correctional administrators have faced the persistent 
problem of managing facilities crowded with too many inmates (Mullen 
1985).9 Despite the seemingly obvious nature of the problem, there is 
no consistent method of determining how many inmates a facility can hold 
(Beck 2000). In fact, in its survey of correctional facilities the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics asks states to report facility capacity in 
three different ways in an effort to capture the major methods (Beck 
2000). These methods are referred to as design, rated, and operational 
capacity. 
intended to house by those who planned l[or designed) the construction of 
the prison. Rated capacity refers to the number of inmates that 
facilities can hold as determined by designated officials within 
individual states. Operational capacity represents the number of 
inmates facilities can hold based upon t.he current availability of 
staff, programming, and services (Beck ;?OOO). Among the other methods 
for determining capacity are spatial density (amount of square feet of 
confinement space per inmate), social density (availability of privacy 
in living spaces), and mobility (amount of time inmates are locked in 
Design capacity is the number of inmates the facility was 
their cells) (Mullen 1985). 
Of course, crowded prisons and jails are far from an exclusively 
American concern. To varying degrees, many other countries experience 
this problem in their correctional systems (see Tonry and Hatlestad 
1997). 
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How er capacit is det rmined, wh n the number of inmates 
I 
exhausts available prison space and/or other resources, crowding becomes 
a problem for correctional facilities. Some concerns about crowding 
expressed by correctional officials relate to safety and security risks, 
reduced access to medical care, programming, and recreational 
opportunities, understaffing and higher levels of staff turnover, 
increased law suits citing conditions of confinement, and general 
deterioration of control over the prison population (Riveland 1999). 
Among these concerns, threats to safety and security posed by crowding 
have perhaps drawn the most attention. It is a reasonable and quite 
I 
common assertion that overcrowding leads to increased levels of 
violence. While there is some support for this assertion (Harer and 
Steffensmeier 1996; Gaes and McGuire 1985), the available research 
evidence on this hypothesis is mixed (Useem and Reisig 1999; Gaes 1994). 
Some conclude that the level of crowding alone may not have a direct 
impact on violence but may be depend on other factors, such as 
individual perceptions (Wooldredge 1997) and management strategies 
(Ruback and Carr 1993). Others have called attention to the potential 
for increased gang presence (Harer and Steffensmeier 1996; Pelz 1996) 
and racial tensions (Henderson, Cullen, Carroll, and Feinberg 2000) to 
contribute to volatile conditions in crowded correctional facilities. 
Concerns about crowded conditions are not restricted to potential 
impact on inmates, but also relate to the impact on staff. Crowding may 
exacerbate job stress that has long been recognized as particularly high 
among correctional employees (Wright, Saylor, Gilman, and Camp 1997). 
Stress among such employees is associated with staff turnover, which is 
also disproportionately high for corrections relative to other 
professions (Finn 2000; Mitchell, MacKenzie, Styve, Gover 2000). Staff 
turnover is costly and may add additional strain on the remaining 
workforce. 
Recently, a trend in correctional management has sought to reduce 
the stress of correctional workers (among other goals) by decentralizing 
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the decision making power within the organizations. In contrast, the 
classical, or control model of prison management represents a style that 
I 
I 
maintains a bureaucratic and highly centralized administration (DiIulio 
1987). Institutions operating under control model-type leadership 
utilize a paramilitary organizational structure and reqpire strict 
adherence to rules and procedures. Little discretion is allocated to 
non-managerial staff. Paralleling developments in non-prison 
organizations, the new approach affords correctional line staff more 
/ 
, I  
discretion in the performance of their duties and application of policy, 
and provides opportunities for input into the operatian of the facility. 
This decentralized management styles have been referred to as the 
Employee Investment Model (Stohr, Lovrich, Menke, and Zupan 1994), 
Participatory Management (Wright et al. 19971, Total Qbality Management 
(Franklin, Platt, Wheatley, and Bohac 19971, and Strategic Management 
, 
(Fleisher 1998). This approach is associated with an increase in 
professionalism among correctional workers, including an emphasis on 
education and training of line staff. Researchers assessing the impact 
of decentralized management styles, relative to more centralized styles, 
have found them to be associated with higher levels job satisfaction for 
line staff (Stohr et al. 1994; Wright et al. 1997) and supervisors 
(Reisig and Lovrich 19981, lower rates of disorder within facilities 
(Reisig 19981, and lower rates of work-related stress (Stohr et al. 
1994). 
HEALTH CARE 
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified adequate medical care as a 
right., rather than a privilege for all inmates in correctional 
faci1,ities (Estelle v. Gamble 1976). This requirement has called 
attention to the major concern that health care can be for 
administrators. Prisoners are largely drawn from low-income populations 
with limited access to medical care. Unhealthful habits prior to 
incarceration; such as poor diet, drug use, and risky sexual behaviors, 
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make correctional inmates a medically needy population (Marquart, 
Merianos, Herbert, and Carroll 1997). Moreover, as inmates age their 
general health condition worsens, requiring more care and physical 
accommodation than inmates at younger ages (Maruschak and Beck 2001; 
Neeley, Addison, and Craig-Moreland 199'7). In fact, older inmates with 
special needs present such unique challenges that some jurisdictions 
have opened specialized assisted-living facilities, such as Washington's 
Ahtamun View Correctional Complex, to provide care for elderly and 
disabled inmates (Potterfield 1999). Even while housed with the general 
population, responding to the needs of aging inmates is expensive. The 
costs associated with the care of older inmates are expected to grow as 
more inmates serve longer terms of incarceration under "get tough" 
sentencing policies (McDonald 1999; Blurnstein 1995). In an assessment 
of the federal system, the General Accounting Office (2000) identifies 
medical needs of older inmates as contributing to an average annual 
increase of 8.6 percent in health care costs over the 1990s. 
In addition to aging inmates, a major health-related concern in 
correctional facilities is serious illnesses such as tuberculosis and 
HIV/AIDS. Because of their life circumstances, inmates are generally 
drawn from populations with a relatively high rate of these illnesses 
(Hammett, Harmon, and Maruschak 1999; Vlahov 1990). Once inside 
correctional facilities, high risk behaviors and close contact between 
inmates in crowded facilities can produce conditions conducive to spread 
of infectious diseases (National Commission on AIDS 1991). According to 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, at the close of 1997 22,338 state 
prisoners were infected with the HIV virus. During that year, 538 of 
2,872 inmate deaths (19 percent) were attributable to AIDS (Maruschak 
1999). In a survey conducted by that National Institute of Justice and 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, inmates with tuberculosis 
infection in responding state and federal facilities numbered 15,033 in 
1997 (Hammett et al. 1999). In a recent report sponsored by the 
National Institute of Justice, the Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the researchers 
conclude that there have been substantial improvements in the control 
I 
and treatment diseases such 
correctional facilities but 
for administrators (Hammett 
PROGRAMMING 
as tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS in U.S. 
they remain considerable health care concern 
et al. 1999). 
Although public opinion is regular.Ly portrayed as punitive toward 
convicted offenders, researchers have found that Americans continue to 
view rehabilitation as an important function of corrections (Applegate, 
Cullen, and Fisher 1997). Despite the "get tough" trend evident in 
corrections over the past twenty years, there remains within 
jurisdictions varying degrees of interest in rehabilitation (Tonry, 
September 1999). Most correctional facilities operate at least some 
rehabilitative programs, available to at: least some members of the 
inmate population. Such treatment programs may target special 
populations, such as programs for sex offenders, substance abusers, or 
those with mental health problems. These programs are largely intended 
to reduce recidivism and generally improve inmates' chances of success 
in the community upon release. Rehabilitative programs may also serve 
other goals, such as reducing idleness and identifying inmates (through 
voluntary program participation and completion) who maybe a lower risk 
for behavioral problems or future offending relative to non-volunteers 
and dropouts (MacKenzie 1997). 
Since the mid-1970s and the publication of Martinson's work 
(1974:), rehabilitative programming was discounted by many as largely 
ineffective. However, a number of researchers have continued to assess 
the performance of treatment program in producing behavioral change in 
participants. At the start of this century, a growing number of 
reviewers conclude that correctional tre<atment programs may in fact 
reduce recidivism, at least for certain types of offenders under some 
conditions (e.9. Andrews, Zinger, Hoge, N3onta, Gendreau, and Cullen 
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1990; MacKenzie 1997; MacKenzie and Hickman 1998; Gaes, Flanagan, 
Motiuk, and Stewart 1999). These positive findings provide renewed 
incentive for prisons to establish and inaintain inmate access to 
appropriate treatment programs within correctional facilities. However, 
the Severe limitation placed on resources such as space and funding 
presented by the ever growing inmate population make providing adequate 
levels of programming a considerable challenge for prison managers 
(Riveland 1999). 
I 
I 
COST OF CORRECTIONS 
However appropriate and necessary :In individual cases, 
incarceration is an expensive response to crime.1° Consequently, one of 
the most obvious impacts of the dramatic increase in the use of 
incarceration over the past twenty years has been the growing cost of 
corrections. Between 1980 and 1994, total capital expenses (costs 
associated with building, renovating, and acquiring land for prisons) 
for federal and state governments rose from $538 million to $2.3 billion 
(General Accounting Office 1996). Construction of prisons and jails is 
only part of the cost of incarceration. 
and jails can far exceed the original costs of construction. According 
to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 1996 (the most recent year for 
which data are available) states spent 94 percent of their prison 
dollars on operating facilities, with the remaining 6 percent going to 
capital expenses (Stephan 1999). In a number of jurisdictions, the 
Day-to-day operation of prisons 
share of state budgets allocated to corrections has grown in an effort 
to keep pace with the need to build and (operate prisons for a record 
number of inmates. 
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One tool available to correctional agencies to assist in reducing 
at least some cost is to engage inmates in prison industry programs and 
upkeep of facilities, such as laundry and janitorial duties. In 
addition to the potential for offsetting at least some cost, inmate work 
programs and activity reduce inmate idleness and may produce 
rehabilitative affects under some conditions (Bouffard, MacKenzie, and 
Hickman 2000). 
10 In this report, the term "costly" refers strictly to 
out-of-pocket expense directly related to incarcerating inmates and does 
not refer to the cost effectiveness of incarceration relative to other 
interventions. While the latter issue is important and has been the 
focus considerable empirical attention (see Zimring and Hawkins 1995)~ 
examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this report. 
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111. REVIEW OF PRIVATIZATION I 
Many commentators have remarked that prison privatization is 
nothing new in the U.S., with roots running back to the "convict-lease" 
system of the Reconstruction era. At that time, privatC entrepreneurs 
leased prisoners to replace slaves that had previously provided labor 
for road gangs, forestry and mining crews, agricultural plantations, and 
manufacturing workshops. Private entrepreneurship entered the field of 
adult corrections again in the early 1980s, as neo-liberal ideas of 
deregulation and privatization interested reformers intent on reducing 
the size of "big government." Private corporations would relieve 
government of the burdens of prison management, charging a per diem fee 
for each prisoner transferred to private confinement. By introducing 
innovative management techniques and reducing bureaucracy, proponents of 
privatization promised that private firms would build facilities faster 
and cheaper, and operate them at less expense, while delivering higher 
quality correctional services. 
In 1983, the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) was formed. 
CCA soon began to flourish, eventually becoming the largest private 
prison company in the world. The Wackenhut Corporation established a 
private prison division the following year. CCA and Wackenhut dominate 
the field, sharing 75 percent of the market between them.ll No other 
company exceeds 9 percent of market share. The private prison industry 
is currently confining approximately 80,000 state and federal prisoners 
under direct contracts or through intergovernmental agreements. 
Despite this sizeable inmate population, a string of operational 
problems, spotlighted by the national media attention, have plagued the 
two industry leaders. In July 1998, six prisoners escaped from a CCA 
facility in Youngstown, Ohio. It later came to light that there had 
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already been 20 stabbings and two homicides at the facility in little 
more than a year of operations. An investigation performed for the U . S .  
Department of Justice reveals that many operational failings had 
contributed to these events. For example, the classification system 
I 
failed to screen out maximum security prisoners in what was intended to 
be a medium security prison. Medical treatment and other programs were 
inadequate. Also, the prison was operated with a largely inexperienced 
staff (Office of the Corrections Trustee 1998). 
I 
Wackenhut has also experienced problems. From December 1996 
through August 1999, there were four pritsoner homicides in two Wackenhut 
prisons in New Mexico and a guard was kJ.lled during a riot. During that 
period, the prisoner homicide rate in the two Wackenhut prisons was one 
for every 400 prisoners, compared to the average national prison 
homicide rate in 1998 of one homicide for every 22,000 prisoners. 
Investigators found indications that Wackenhut had not been meeting 
acceptable standards for classification of prisoners, staffing, program 
services, or security procedures. 
, 
Two Wackenhut contracts have since been terminated when more 
problems surfaced. Operation of the Travis County State Jail was taken 
over by the state after a dozen Wackenhuit staff were investigated for 
alleged sexual misconduct. In Jena, Louisiana, a Wackenhut facility for 
juvenile offenders was closed after a judge found evidence of human 
rights abuses and brutality. Reports detailing the problems in these 
private prisons cited inadequacies in staffing and program operations. 
In the wake of these highly publicized events, the industry has 
suffered in the financial markets. From 1995 through 1997, CCA had 
ranked among the top five performing companies on the New York Stock 
Exchange. In the summer of 1997, CCA stock traded at $45 a share. In 
mid-December 2000, the stockls value was just 19 cents a share. 
Wackenhut spun off its prison subsidiary in 1988. The company 
went public in 1994, and is now formally known as l'WCC.'l The Wackenhut 
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Wackenhut also experienced a decline. .After the death of the guard in 
New Mexico, its stock price dropped 28 percent over two days. 
Debate about the causes and remedies for the problems of private 
prisons has been heated. 
that their fears about privatization have been realized--that a profit 
orientation in as complex and risky business such as prison operation 
would result in disaster. 
Opponents of prison privatization maintain 
While conceding that some facilities have failed to offer safe, 
humane conditions of confinement, corporate executives have 
characterized these as exceptional cases in an otherwise successful 
industry. 
higher standard than public corrections, and that the media unfairly 
exposes problems in private facilities that go unnoticed in the public 
sector. 
They charge that the private prison sector is held to a much 
TO date, the body of research literature fails to offer much 
credible evidence to inform this debate. Few areas of correctional 
research have been more contentious. Despite the interest in topic of 
privatization, there are relatively few studies and many of these are 
lacking rigorous methodology. 
prison services has involved random assignment of prisoners. 
focusing on the costs of private prisons'relative to public prisons 
For example, no study of the quality of 
Studies 
often fail to examine comparable services or facilities, i.e., they 
compare "apples to oranges." Finally, there are questions whether 
findings of various studies can be generalized across time and 
jurisdiction. 
RESEARCH ON COST COMPARISONS 
Research findings on costs and savings of private prisons versus 
public prisons have been generally inconsistent and contradictory. Some 
find that privatization can reduce operational costs by 10 to 15 percent 
Corporation continues to hold a 56 percent share of sWCCti stock. 
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(Moore 1997). In a review of the literature, however, a team of 
researchers led by Douglas McDonald concluded that "the few existing 
studies and other available data do not provide strong evidence of any 
general pattern" of cost-savings '[McDonald et al. 1998, p. v). 
another synthesis of the literature, Pratt and Maahs conducted a 
meta-analysis of 24 cost studies. They found that the best predictors 
of prison per diem costs were facility-related factors, such as size, 
age, and security level. They concluded that private prisons are not 
more cost-effective than public prisons (Pratt and Maahs 1999). 
In 
There are limitations to this bod{ of research that complicate 
interpretation of findings. Most studies neglect to take account of 
additional costs that may be incurred on top of contracted per diem 
charges. None have adequately traced costs over time to understand how 
expenditure patterns may shift. In addation, some of the cost savings 
reported might be artifacts of the methods used to allocate government 
overhead costs rather than actually savings. 
Most studies have failed to account for aspects of public and 
private prison operations that may render them not truly comparable, 
including facility design and prison population characteristics. Other 
differences are that private prison per diem fees may be maintained a 
lower level when private contractors negotiate a cap on the medical 
costs per inmate. Thus, inmates requiring more expensive medical care 
are placed within or transferred to public rather than private 
facilities. Privatization may produce savings by cutting costs for 
health services, staff compensation, and by lowering personnel staffing 
ratios (Nelson 1998). Employee compensation and staffing ratios tend to 
increase over time, however, as labor market demands become more 
intense, and as investigation of operational problems and civil rights 
litigation force changes in programs and policies that affect 
operational costs. 
If cost-savings are possible through privatization, the extent of 
these savings is likely to vary considerably depending upon the public 
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correctional system that serves as a comparison. For example, the 
potential for savings associated with privatization is reduced when 
compared to a public corrections system that incorporates the 
fundamentals of cost-effective management, such as efficient facility 
design, prudent staffing ratios, comprehensive management information 
systems, streamlined procurement, medical cost controls, and trim 
administrative operations. 
/ 
I 
COMPARISON OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES 
Cost savings represent only one side of the privatization ledger; 
the quality of correctional service provided is another point on which 
the performance of public prisons has been compared to private prisons. 
Little is known about the quality of pra-vate prisons because most 
studies have focused primarily or exclusively on cost issues. Of the 
existing studies, most are of limited value because they compare 
services and programs delivered to dissimilar correctional populations, 
using non-random comparison groups (GAO 1996; McDonald et. al. 1998). 
The Urban Institute (1989) compared the quality of services in 
three pairs of institutions (one pair housing adults and two pairs 
housing juveniles). Their findings from adult private and public 
prisons in Kentucky favored the private facility. The public facility 
housed a more difficult population, however, and the study has been 
criticized for lacking a sound theoretical model for specification of 
appropriate performance measures (Gaes et al. 1998: 4). 
Charles Logan (1993) supplied a taxonomy for measuring performance 
of prison operations. His "confinement inodel" identifies eight key 
elements for assessment: security, safety, order, care, activity, 
justice, conditions, and management. Some however have criticized 
Logan's model for omitting the elements of education and treatment 
services. In a comparative study of quality in three women's prisons 
(one private, one state and one federal prison), Logan analyzed data 
from operational records and staff and inmate interviews. While staff 
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,interview data favored the private prison, the inmate surveys favored 
the public prison on all but one measure (activity). Logan nonetheless 
concluded that the private prison was more effective on six of his eight 
dimensions. The state public prison scored higher on the care element 
and was not different from the private and federal women's prisons on 
the dimension of justice.12 
/ I  
Logants findings have been criticized for over-reliance on staff 
survey responses, since private prison staff might offer biased 
responses given that their prospects for continued employment could be 
at stake. Critics have also charged that he lacked experience and 
objectivity in the interpretation of several performance measures (Gaes, 
Camp, and Saylor 1998). 
In more recent evaluations, researchers have attempted to overcome 
the @'apples and orangestt problem. A legislative study in Tennessee 
compared a private prison with two public facilities that were built at 
nearly the same time, with similar architecture. The research team 
concluded that the facilities were roughly equivalent on a number of 
service performance, including safety, personnel, facility conditions, 
health care, and inmate activities (Tennessee Legislative Select 
Oversight Committee 1995). 
Archambeault and Deis (1996) compared two private prisons with a 
public prison in Louisiana that were constructed on similar architecture 
and opened around the same time. Data were analyzed on a number of 
performance indicators such as escapes, assaults, sexual misconduct, 
disturbances, deaths, disciplinary actions, grievances, drug tests, 
communicable diseases, participation in education and vocational 
training, attainment of General Education Diplomas, and medical care. 
l2 Logan collected data from a public prison in New Mexico and the 
private prison that succeeded it in the same state (studying essentially 
the same female population before and after they were transferred from 
the public facility to the private facility). 
comparison with the federal prison for women at Alderson, West Virginia 
He added a third 
(Logan 1993). 
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The researchers concluded that the private facilities 
out-performed the public prison on most measures. 
however, has received criticism on various methodological issues, e.g., 
reanalysis of raw serious misconduct data indicated that the comparative 
rates of serious misconduct were much less favorable to the private 
The research, 
/ I  
prisons (Gaes, Camp and Saylor 1998). 
The Washington State Legislative Budget Committee (1996) assessed 
the feasibility of prison privatization by looking at costs and 
performance at the same facilities evalu.ated in Tennessee and Louisiana. 
The Committee's findings were consistent with the conclusions of 
Tennessee researchers, but differed with. those of the researchers in 
Louisiana. They concluded that the quality of prison services and 
performance was generally similar in the private and public facilities. 
In Arizona, Thomas conducted a study comparing the operational 
performance of a private, minimum security "treatment facility!! with the 
average scores of 15 state-operated facilities (Thomas 1997). He 
concl.uded that the private facility was superior to this average in such 
dimensions as public safety, risk of injury or death for staff and 
inmates, and compliance with professional standards. He found, however, 
that Ilone or more individual state-operated prisons had performance 
records that were equivalent or superiortt to the private facility. For 
example, across at least one critical program dimension--monthly 
educational program enrollment--five pub:Lic prisons had monthly 
enrollment rates that were much higher than had been attained in the 
private prison. 
Researchers from the University of Minnesota conducted a 
comparison of public and private prison services in that state. The 
study relied primarily on data from structured interviews of matched 
sets of medium-security inmates. On most: dimensions of prison 
operations (prison safety and security; availability, quality, and 
intensity of education and treatment programs; and staff qualifications 
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and experience) prisoners gave the public prisons significantly higher 
ratings. 
Data drawn from state agency records supported prisoners' 
perceptions that security staff were less experienced at the private 
prison. The staff turnover rate at the private facility was more than 
three times higher than at the public prisons. Prisoners housed at the i 
private prison gave significantly lower ratings to prison educational 
programs than did their counterparts in Minnesota's public prisons, who 
attained General Education Diplomas at a 35 percent higher rate (Greene 
2000). 
Only one study has attempted to assess comparative performance of 
private and public prisons in terms of recidivism. 
experimental design involving matched comparison groups, Lanza-Kaduce 
and Parker (1998) compared recidivism rates (defined as new criminal 
offenses) of inmates released from pub1i.c and private prisons in 
Florida. 
recidivism than released public prisoners. Further, new offenses 
Using a quasi- 
They found that private prison releasees had a lower rate of 
committed by private prison releasees were found to be less serious than 
those committed by public prison releasees. 
The findings of the Lanza-Kaduce and Parker study have been 
questioned because of concerns that the public and private prison 
populations were not comparable, the sampling techniques were flawed, 
and that there were discrepancies in how recidivism was measured 
(Florida Department of Corrections 1998). 
One of the difficulties faced by researchers in assessing private 
prisons is the lack of quality data. In partial response to this need, 
the U.S. Department of Justice sponsored a national survey of private 
prisons, conducted by Austin. 
comparisons with survey data from public prisons on a range of issues. 
Sixty-five private prisons participated in the survey, providing data 
that described both prisoner and facility characteristics, programs 
offered, staffing levels, and prisoner misconduct. 
The survey produced data that allowed for 
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Austin found relatively few significant differences between 
private and public operation of prisons. 
were higher at private prisons, though staff-to-prisoner ratios were 15 
percent lower. 
Program participation rates 
Levels of violence' in private prisons were substantially 
higher, i.e., there were 49 percent more assaults on staff, and 65 
percent more prisoner-on-prisoner assaults (Austin and Coventry 1999). 
Overall, Austin concluded that in most respects (custody levels, 
personnel, types of programs) the private prisoners were similar to 
public prisons, with a modest reduction in labor costs for private 
prisons. 
SUMMARY 
Overall, the body of available research on the costs and quality 
of private prisons relative to public prisons can lend no solid support 
to any conclusions. 
The existing research has yet to overcome a number of difficult 
methodological issues, such as constructing defensible comparison groups 
and establishing a means for comparing actual costs associated with 
To date, very little research has been conducted. 
I 
private and public prisons. However, available research suggests 
potential problems that accompany privatization. 
research is necessary to provide more co.nclusive answers. 
More high quality 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
- 26 - 
IV. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF VOIJTIS ON PRISON MANAGEMENT AND PRIVATIZATION 
The purpose of VOI/TIS funds is to incarcerate more violent 
/ I  
offenders for longer periods of time. 
within the context of the Itget tough" movement that has produced 
numerous similar changes in sentencing and corrections policy. Within a 
correctional system already strapped for resources to manage an 
expanding incarcerated population, it is reasonable to expect that 
Changes produced by VOI/TIS occur 
further expansion is likely to exacerbate the existing challenges facing 
correctional administrators. Below we discuss potential impacts of 
VOI/TIS changes on several major issues of concern for prison 
operations. 
EARLY RELEASE 
I Both the VOI and T I S  grants are incentives for states to reduce 
opportunities for early release of violent offenders. TIS  grants 
require states to ensure that violent offenders serve at least 85 
percent of their sentence and VOI grants require lengthy sentences 
(along with other stiffening of penalties).13 
administrators have long regarded early release as an important tool to 
Correctional 
motivate compliant behavior (Proctor and Pease 2000; Parisi and Zillo 
1983). It is possible that the removal of such opportunities may 
complicate the task of maintaining an orderly prison environment. 
recent study, Memory and colleagues found evidence in favor of this 
hypothesis in North Carolina. 
transition from a sentencing structure allowing good time and parole 
eligibility to a structure removing these early release mechanisms. 
Among those inmates not eligible for early release, the researchers 
In a 
The researchers examined the impact of a 
found more, and more serious, disciplinary infractions than among 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
- 27 - 
inmates whose behavior might influence their release date (Memory, Guo, 
Parker, and Sutton 1999). Thus, implementation of VOI/TIS policies may 
result in a reduction of compliant behavior within the correctional 
population. 
, 
/ I  
Another potential outcome is that VOI/TIS policies may contribute 
to further expansion of prison populations. Early release and parole 
have been regarded by some scholars as mechanisms for control of the 
size of the correctional population (Blumstein and Cohen 1973). The 
stability of the prison population for most of last century, despite 
demographic shifts and major historical events (such as the Great 
Depression, several wars, and periods social unrest), has been 
attributed to policies allowing correctional administrators to control 
the t:iming of release (Blumstein 1995). With the advent of the "get 
tough" movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s, this authority was 
reduced or eliminated in many states. This restriction of early release 
authority has contributed to the dramatic growth in the prison 
populations (Blumstein and Beck 1999). A further reduction of release 
authority under VOI/TIS and other "get tough" policies can be expected 
to produce more of the same, in terms of prison population growth. 
CLASSIFICATION 
Another potential impact of VOI/TIS policies on prison management 
is in the area of inmate classification. In determining initial custody 
level, most states rely on objective classification schemes that take 
into account factors associated with potential risk (Austin 1993). One 
important factor associated with higher risk under these schemes is 
severity of the crime of conviction (Austin 1993). Consequently, 
inmates sentenced to prison for violent crimes are likely to be assigned 
to higher levels of custody than comparable non-violent inmates. 
l3 See Chapter I for a full description of the requirements for TIS 
and VOI incentive grants. 
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Classification systems in some states also include the length of 
sentence as a factor in classification, i.e., longer sentences are 
associated with higher classification (Fernandez and Neiman 1998). TO 
the extent that VOI/TIS policies increase the number of violent 
offenders in prisons and the length of time these offenders spend in 
prison, it is reasonable to expect an increase in the number of inmates 
classified at high custody levels. This is particularly likely as 
violent of fenders spend more time incarlzerated, thus reducing the rate 
of turnover of available beds. This issue may be of concern to states 
because of the elevated costs associated with constructing and operating 
higher custody prison environments relative to lower levels (Fernandez 
and Neiman 1998; Solomon and Camp 1993) In addition, correctional 
systems may attempt to accommodate more violent offenders by increasing 
/ 
release of lower level property offenders. This would serve to decrease 
the share of low risk inmates in prisons. This may prove problematic, 
in that these low risk inmates are frequently utilized for staff 
positions within institutions that require mobility and independence, 
such as office assistance or fire crew duty. 
CROWDING 
Perhaps the most frequent prediction about the impact of policies 
intended to incarcerate more violent offenders for longer periods of 
time and establish truth in sentencing is that they are likely to 
exacerbate the crowded conditions that czlrrently exist in many 
correctional facilities (e.g. MacKenzie 2000; Caplow and Simon 1999). 
One explanation for how prison crowding might be produced is offered by 
Wooldredge (1997). In a study assessing the impact of state policies on 
prisons, he describes an indirect relationship between prison crowding 
and policies that limit early release discretion. Wooldredge finds that 
such policies produce more long-term inmates. 
of long-term inmates reduces the rate of prison population turnover. 
Thus, increasing numbers of long-term inmates contribute to prison 
In turn, a larger share 
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crowding by holding prison beds out of circulation. 
are intended to create long-term inmates and therefore can reasonably be 
expected to increase prison crowding. 
VOI/TIS policies 
1 
Increased crowding conditions may have influences in other areas 
of prison operation as well. One concern about crowding is that it may 
reduce safety for both staff and inmates. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, at least some evidence links crowded conditions to violence 
within prisons (Harer and Steffensmeier 1996; Gaes and McGuire 1985). 
General misconduct rates may increase as a related manifestation of 
crowding (Ruback and Carr 1993). In addition, conditions of confinement 
produced by crowding have given rise to many inmate grievances and law 
suits (Gaes 1994). An exacerbation of these conditions related to 
VOI/TIS can be expected to result in an increase in inmate initiation of 
internal and external legal proceedings. Crowding may also negatively 
impact staffing levels and turnover. 
correctional officers falls short of the rate of growth in the prison 
To the extent that hiring of 
I 
population, the ratio of inmates to staff could be expected to increase. 
This may lead to reduced inmate control and greater stress among a 
workforce already characterized by high levels of job stress and 
turnover (Finn 2000; Mitchell et al. 2000). In sum, implementation of 
VOI/TIS policies may have the affect of exacerbating crowded conditions 
in correctional facilities which may, in turn, lead to higher rates of 
assault on both staff and inmates, higher rates of general inmate 
misconduct, increases in inmate filing of grievances and law suits, and 
increases in inmate to staff ratio and staff turnover. 
I 
HEALTH CARE 
To the extent that VOI/TIS policies increase terms of 
incarceration and crowding within prisons, inmate health care may be 
impacted. Gaes (1994) argues that the available research attempting to 
link illness and correctional crowding is too methodologically weak to 
support sound conclusions about the existence or nature of this link. 
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Despite the lack of empirical evidence, it is reasonable to suspect more 
sophisticated research may identify such a relationshtp. In the case of 
communicable diseases, such as TB and H'IV, many suggest that closer 
I 
contact between inmates under crowded conditions may facilitate the 
spread of illness (Hammett et al. 1999). Others suggest that crowded 
I conditions may also make inmates more susceptible to such diseases due 
to a stressful, generally unhealthful environment (Marquart et al. 
1997). Increases in sentence length may also impakt correctional health 
I ,  
care. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics' most recent inmate 
survey, longer-term prisoners reported suffering more injuries and 
illnesses than inmates incarcerated for a shorter period of time 
(Maruschak and Beck 2001). 
One possible consequence of longer sentences may be higher rates 
of TR and HIV/AIDS. Longer sentences may expose individual inmates to 
these diseases over a longer time period!, thus providing more 
opportunity for transmission. 
policies may be an increase in TB and HIV/AIDS among the correctional 
population. As discussed in a previous chapter, another health care 
issue relates to aging inmates. VOI/TIS and other get tough policies 
that lengthen sentences and restrict early release are likely to 
increase the share of older inmates in the prison population. 
group of inmates requires more medical care and accommodation than 
younger inmates (Neeley et al. 1997). It is reasonable to expect that 
an increase in this segment of the prison population will place a 
greater demand on health care serves and raise the overall cost of these 
services as a result. 
Thus, another potential' 'impact of VOI/TIS 
This 
PROGRAMMING 
Implementation of VOI/TIS policies may also serve to reduce 
participation of inmates in rehabilitative programming. Early release 
incentives have been considered 
effective in motivating inmates 
by many correctional administrators as 
to voluntarily participate in 
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rehabilitation programming (Parisi and Zillo 1983). In the absence of 
early release incentives, inmates may be less inclined to willingly 
engage in rehabilitation programs. 
be impacted in an indirect way. Inmates without early release 
incentives may engage in higher levels of non-compliant behavior (Memory 
et al. 1999). This may result in greater use of disciplinary techniques 
that isolate inmates from others or restrict their activities, including 
participation in programming. 
other "get tough" policies that may decrease participation in 
programming is increased crowding. Under crowded conditions, the 
availability of rehabilitation programs for all inmates may be reduced 
because programs are unable to increase their capacity to serve a 
I 
Programming participation may also 
i' 
I ,  
Another :factor rela'ted to VOI/TIS and 
growing prison population. Moreover, under crowded conditions, space is 
at a premium. Areas previously used fox programming, such as gymnasiums 
and classrooms, may be converted to living space to accommodate 
additional inmates. 
COST OF CORRECTIONS 
While VOI/TIS is a program that provides states with money for 
correctional systems, it is also likely to increase the cost of those 
correctional systems. Correctional budgets are broadly categorized into 
funds for building and equipping facilities (capital budget) and funds 
for operation of facilities (operating budget). 
times larger than the former. 
budget of the state and federal systems was approximately $78 million 
and the average operating budget was roughly $580 million (Camp and Camp 
The latter may be many 
For example, in 1999 the average capital 
1999). VOI/TIS funds may increase state correctional costs because the 
federal dollars may used to build capacity, but not to fund the much 
more costly operation of prison facilities. In fact, the General 
Accounting Office (1998) identified cost as the leading reason why 
states elected not to seek TIS federal funds. In interviews with state 
officials, 23 states were identified as lacking legislation that would 
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ensure TIS eligibility. Officials in the majority of these states (16 
of 23) reported that the federal funds were forfeited because of 
concerns about increases in state expenses that would be not be offset 
by TIS funds. 
prison operational cost. To the extent that VOI/TIS impacts these 
Most of the management issues discussed above impact 
issues, it is reasonable to expect operational costs to increase. For 
example, a larger share of older inmates and higher rates of TB and . 
HIV/AIDS are likely to lead to increased health care costs (GAO 2000; 
Hammett et al. 1999). Operational costs are likely to be an increasing 
burden on states implementing VOI/TIS policies as these correctional 
systems experience the numerous related impacts of incarcerating more 
offenders for longer periods of time. 
PRIVATIZATION 
States receiving VOI/TIS funds can use them for renting beds in 
private prison and jails and to finance the construction or operation of 
private prisons or jails. 
available for "bricks and mortar" and cannot be used for operational 
uses, privatization becomes an attractive option to obtain additional 
beds without having to use funds from other sources for operations. 
Given that VOI/TIS money is otherwise only 
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V. METHODS OF THE STUDY 
I 
The purpose of this study was to assess whether and how VOI/TIS 
policies have impacted the management and privatization of prisons in 
the United States. A multi-tiered research design was employed that 
utilized three major methodologies: nationwide analyses of available 
data, seven state-level prison management case studies, and three 
in-depth state-level privatization case studies. These three methods 
I 
are discussed below. 
NATIONAL DATA SOURCES 
1 
Corrections Yearbook 
The Corrections Yearbook is a publication produced annually by 
Camille Graham Camp and George Camp of the Criminal Justice Institute. 
The publication is a compilation of annual results from surveys 
distributed by the organization to state correctional agencies in all 50 
states, the District of Columbia, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, along 
with other criminal justice agencies. Among other thkngs, the 
Corrections Yearbook provides state-level data on prison population 
profile, facility characteristics, budgets, programming, and 
correctional staff. The bulk of the data for the national analyses were 
conducted on a database constructed from data published annually in the 
Corrections Yearbook for the years 1986 through 1999. 
Because of the nature of the publications, Corrections Yearbook 
data must be interpreted with caution. Response to the annual surveys 
is voluntary, a lack of standardized definitions means that individual 
correctional agencies may vary widely in1 types o f  data they report, and 
the publishers do not independently verify reported data. Thus, the 
Corrections Yearbook is not an ideal source of data. Despite these 
limitations, we include these data in our analyses because there is no 
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other source of national data that gives us an indication of key prison ' 
management trends over time. 
American Correctional Association (ACA) Survey of State Correctional 
Officials 
/ TO supplement existing data sources as part of its'national 
evaluation of VOI/TIS (Turner, et al. 2001), RAND contracted with the 1 ,  
American Correctional Association (ACA) to conduct, a special survey 
among state correctional officials. The ACA fielded a survey of state 
departments of correction in all 50 states and the Di$trict of Columbia 
in the summer of 1998. Thirty-seven states (including the District of 
Columbia) returned surveys (72 percent). States were asked to indicate 
the extent of changes in a number of prison operations and activities 
since 1996, when VOI/TIS funds became available, including the types of 
offenders in prison, inmate activities and programs, prison staffing, 
and effects on operations (including use of gain/good"lfime, parole, 
etc.). See Appendix B for a copy of the survey and a list of the states 
that responded. 
National Analyses 
For the purpose of examining trends in correctional management 
issues, we conducted analyses by comparing states by two major 
characteristics that are of policy interest in understanding the impact 
of VOI/TIS: 
0 states receiving TIS funds versus those that did not 
0 states that have "structured" sentencing--determinate 
sentencing or voluntary or presumptive guidelines--versus 
indeterminate sentencing states 
We would expect that those states receiving TIS funds, all things 
being equal, would experience the most pressures on prison management. 
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This is because they are the ones that have passed 85% sentence 
requirements for violent offenders. We include the "structured vs. 
indeterminate" dimension because it represents one of the major 
distinctions in state sentencing practices in the U.S. States with 
indeterminate sentencing may be able to adapt more readily to VOI/TIS 
and other "get tough" policies due to greater flexibility in the length 
of sentence imposed and served.14 
I 
Table 5.1 shows how the states are distributed on these 
characteristics. 
l4 In these states, terms €or violent offenders would be 
constrained; however, terms for property offenders might be adjusted. 
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Table 5.1.15 
TIS and Structured Sentencing, by State 
Truth-in- Structured 
State Sentencinq Sentencinq 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
I1 1 inoi s 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louis iana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Oreqon X X 
(continued on next page) 
15 This table is taken from Turner et al. (2001). 
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Table 5 . 1  (cont'd) 
TIS and Structured Sentencing, by State 
Truth-inn- Structured 
State Sentencinq Sentencinq 
Rhode Island 
South Carolina X 
South Dakota 
Tennessee X X 
Texas 
X Utah x 
Vermont 
Pennsylvania X X 
I 
Virginia X X 
Washington X X 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyominq 
NOTE: Classification of states having structured 
sentencing is based on Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
National Assessment of Structured Sentencing (1996). 
Defining "truth-in-sentencing" for federal truth-in-sentencing 
awards is somewhat complex. Determinate sentencing states can qualify 
for funds if they have passed legislation requiring persons convicted of 
a Part 1 violent crime to serve not less than 85 percent of the sentence 
imposed or have passed TIS laws that result in persons convicted of a 
Part 1 violent crime serving on average not less than 85 percent of the 
sentence imposed. Indeterminate sentencing states can qualify for TIS 
funds if, based on existing policies, offenders serve on average 8 5  
percent or more of their maximum sentence (or prison term established 
under the state's sentencing and release guidelines) in prison. These 
determinations were made during the stateas application process for TIS 
funds under the Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994. Other states adopted versions of truth-in-sentencing legislation 
with less than the federal requirement o f  85 percent or with variants of 
an 85 percent criterion that did not meet federal requirements for TIS 
funding . 
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For purposes of the present analyses, TIS classification is based 
on funding, not on whether the state passed TIS legislation--although 
all but three of the states that received TIS funding also passed 
qualifying TIS legislation. 
and passage of TIS legislation is small.16 
its effect, particularly for quantitative measures of crime and 
sentences, swamps the effects of other non-TIS states. 
Thus,” the distinction between TIS funding 
We separate out Texas, since 
PRISON MANAGEMENT CASE STUDIES 
The second tier of the research design consisted of case studies 
in seven states. The purpose of the case studies was to gain more 
detailed information about how VOI/TIS policies may have impacted prison 
management. The case study states were selected to provide a mix of 
sentencing structures. These states were California, Florida, New York, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. The data collection 
consisted primarily of a detailed phone interview conducted with a key 
individual within each state’s prison system. 
appropriate interviewees, we utilized existing contacts within the 
respective departments of corrections. We called upon individuals 
(often working in a research capacity) with whom RAND had established a 
previous relationship through the VOI/TIS national evaluation. These 
individuals were asked to identify potential interviewees within their 
state departments of correction with extensive present and historical 
knowledge of the state’s prison system, including daily management 
In order to identify 
issues, departmental policy, and historical trends. The potential 
interviewees identified through this process were all senior personnel, 
primarily division directors, who had worked within state corrections 
for many years and in a number of capacities. 
l6 New Mexico, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia were not 
included as TIS states in analyses, since they enacted TIS later than 
the most recently available data. 
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, Each potential interviewee was mailed a letter describing the 
study and requesting their participation in a one-hour telephone 
interview. We enclosed with the letter the list of questions that would 
be discussed during the semi-structured interview and several graphs of 
state-specific data from the Corrections Yearbook relevant to the 
interview questions. The potential interviewees were contacted one week 
after receipt of the letter and all seven individuals agreed to 
participate. In two cases, the interviewees enlisted t5e assistance of 
other staff to prepare written responses to the interview questions, 
/ I  
which were then submitted in lieu of a telephone interview.17 
interviewees requested that their names be withheld to allow them to 
answer our questions more candidly. In honor of this request, the names 
and position titles of all individuals are not being provided. 
Many of 
Questions for the semi-structured interview were designed to cover 
the major issues of interest in prison management and privatization (see 
Appendix A for the list of research questions). Interviewees were also 
prompted to elaborate on some state-specific issues introduced during 
the interview. In some cases additional data were requested to 
supplement the information provided by the interviewee. 
In addition to information gathered from interviews for the case 
studies, we have also utilized responses from the five study states 
(California, Florida, New York, Texas, and Washington) that responded to 
the ACA survey to supplement information for the prison management case 
studies. 
IN-DEPTH PRIVATIZATION CASE STUDIES 
Most states in the Southern United States embraced prison 
privatization as one avenue for expanding prison capacity to accommodate 
l7 In one instance, our contact within the research unit directly 
secured the cooperation of potential interviewees within the department 
and participated in the preparation of written responses to our 
interview questions. 
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prison population growth trends both before and after the passage of the 
1994 Crime Act. The focus of the case studies was to examine the 
challenges that face public correctiona:l administrators in initiating 
and managing prison privatization, and to examine the experience gained 
in coping with the risks this entails. Three states were selected for 
1 
in-depth privatization case studies: Texas, Florida, and North 
Carolina. 
Searches were conducted of in-state newspaper databases to collect 
news items that provided background information on the development and 
performance of private prison operations in each state. Site visits 
were made in all three states to conduct facility tours and conduct 
in-depth interviews of government offic:Lals involved with privatization 
of prisons. Six private and three public prison tours included 
interviews with facility managers, monitors, and key program staff. 
Interviews were conducted with senior correctional administrators 
involved with contracting, managing, and assessing private prison 
operations. Officials from other state agencies who are currently 
engaged in assessment of prison costs and/or performance in two states 
(Texas and Florida) were also interviewed. 
Requests for a wide range of documents were made, including 
requests for proposals, private prison contracts, monitoring reports, 
and facility audits. All available assessments or evaluations comparing 
costs and/or performance between privata and public prisons were 
collected and reviewed. DOC research staff in Florida were willing to 
provide summary profile data from the computerized management 
information system to allow for a limited comparison of the types of 
prisoners held in roughly comparable public and private facilities, and 
of their involvement with prison programs. 
After review of the collected documents and data, follow-up 
telephone interviews were conducted with key DOC managers to elicit 
further information and encourage interviewees to elaborate on a variety 
I ' 
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9f critical issues. The findings from the three state in-depth case 
studies which follows below includes: 
/ I  
0 a brief discussion of the history of private prison 
developments in each state 
0 a description of how responsibilities for management and 
oversight for private prisons is allocated and executed 
0 how private prison operations are contracted and monitored and 
the types of operational problems encountered 
0 what has been learned to date a.bout the effects of 
privatization on correctional closts and performance 
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VI. NATIONAL TRENDS IN PRISON MANAGEMENT 
In this chapter we present national trends on the key prison 
/ I  
management issues that are addressed in more detail in our case studies. 
We begin with the analysis of prison management conducted for the 
National VOI/TIS evaluation. For this evaluation, correctional 
administrators were asked a number of questions regarding prison 
management changes that have occurred since 1996, the year during which 
VOI/TIS funds were made available to states and territories. This 
analysis revealed a number of interesting findings, particularly with 
respect to those states that did and did not pass TIS legislation. This 
discussion is followed by analyses of nationwide trends using 
Corrections Yearbook data over time, starting before the 1994 Crime Act, 
as amended, was enacted and before passage of TIS legislation by many 
I individual states. Analyses are presented for TIS, non-TIS states, and 
Texas. We also discuss results of analyses (often not graphed) for 
states with structured versus indeterminate sentencing structures. 
vOI/TIS IMPACT ON PRISON OPERATIONS: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VOI/TIS 
 EVALUATION^^ 
As part of the national VOI/TIS evaluation, we surveyed state 
correctional administrators regarding the effects of VOI/TIS on prison 
and jail admissions, characteristics of the prison population, effects 
on prison inmate activities and programs, prison staffing, and 
operations since 1996, when VOI/TIS funds became availablelg. 
TIS states, non-TIS states, and Texas all reported increases in 
prison populations since 1996, as shown in Table 6.1. Texas reported 
Material in this one section, IvVOI/TIS Impact of Prison 
Operationsrv was taken from Turner et al. (2001); the remaining material 
in the chapter is newly conducted analyses. 
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significant increases in virtually every category of inmates. 
significant difference between TIS and non-TIS states occurred in the 
number of juveniles tried as adults, with TIS states experiencing a 
steeper increase. 
The only 
Table 6.1 
Change8 in Prison Population Since 1996 
~~ 
TIS Non-TIS Texas 
Violent offenders 3.5 3.2 4.0 
Property offenders 4.0 3.7 4.0 
Drug offenders 3.4 3.4 5 . 0  
Other offenders 3.6 3.6 5.0 
Adults 3.6 3.4 5.0 
Juveniles sentenced as adults 4.1 3.6* 3.0 
Juven i 1 e s 3.6 3.3 3.0 
Males 3.3 3.5 5.0 
Females 3.9 3.8 5.0 
Offenders 50+ 3.8 3.6 5.0 
Offenders with drug/alcohol needs 4.0 3.5 3.0 
Offenders with physical health problems 3.4 3.7 5.0 
Offenders with mental health problems 3.5 3.2 5.0 
* p e .0520 (l=substantially decreased; 5=substantially increased) 
Many inmate activities and programs have also increased since 
1996, though the increases are, for the most part, relatively small. 
TIS states had significantly more inmates housed in secure units than 
non-TIS states, while Texas saw large increases in inmate gang activity, 
infractions, and assaults on staff, as well as in inmates housed in 
secure units. 
given in Table 6.2. 
Details of changes in inmate activities and programs are 
l9 States were asked to rate increases/decreases since 1996, and to 
attribute the percent of the change attributable to VOI/TIS. 
Unfortunately, due to missing data, we were unable to use the latter. 
2o  Texas was not included in significance testing, which applies 
only to TIS states vs. non-TIS states. 
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Table 6.2 
Changes in Prison Inmate Activities and Programs dince 1996 
TIS Non-TIS Texas 
Inmates who work regularly 3.6 3.4 3.0 
Inmates being educated regularly 3.4 3.3 3.0 
Inmates with outside recreation 3.3 3.1 3.0 
Inmates with visitation privileges 3.2 3.0 3.0 
Inmate drug treatment programs 3.9 3.6 4.0 
Inmate drug testing 3.9 3.8 3.0 
Inmates who test positive for drugs 3.3 2.8 3 .O 
Inmate gang activity 3.4 ' 3.4 5.0 
Inmates housed in secure units 3.8 3.2* 5.0 
Inmates double-bunked 3.4 3.4 3.0 
Inmates triple bunked 3.2 3.1 3.0 
Inmate infractions 3 -4 3.3 5.0 
- Inmate assaults on staff 3.1 3 -2 5.0 
* p e .0521 (l=substantially decreased; 5=substantially increased) 
Inmate appeals 3.2 3.2 ' 3.0 
With the increase in inmates has come a corresponding need for 
more staff, as illustrated in Table 6.3. At the same time, staff 
training has increased very slightly if at all, and Tkixas admitted that 
staff qualifications have actually decreased since 1996. 
Table 6.3 
Changes in Prison Staffing Since 1996 
TIS Non-TIS Texas 
Number of staff 3.9 3.7 5.0 
Male staff 3.8 3.5 5.0 
Female staff 3.9 3.5 5 . 0  
Staff qualifications 3.1 3.2 2.0 
Hours worked by staff 3.1 3.4 3.0 
Hours of training 3.2 3.4 - -  
Security training 3.2 3.2 - -  
Physical training 3.2 3.2 - -  
- -  Other traininq 3.2 3.1 
NOTE: (l=substantially decreased; S=substantially increased) 
Texas claims no changes in prison operation since 1996, and other 
states report relatively small changes, ,as well, as shown in Table 6.4. 
21 Texas was not included in significance testing, which applies 
only to TIS states vs. non-TIS states. 
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The use of good time/gain time has declined in both TIS and non-TIS 
states, as has use of parole in TIS states only. 
Table 6.4 
Changes in Operations Since 1996 
~ ~ 
TIS Non-TIS Texas 
Use of good time/gain time 2.3 2.7 3.0 
use of parole 2.5 3.1* 3.0 
post release supervision (other than parole) 3.2 3.5 3.0 
Inmate classification 3 -3 3.1 3.0 
For risk 3.3 3.2 3.0 
For programming needs 3.2 3.2 3.0 
For prison manaqement 3.3 3.3 3.0 
* p e .0522 (l=substantially decreased; S=substantially increased) 
Our analyses show that in the last few years, prisons have seen 
increases in all types of offenders, not just violent offenders. 
Although positive prison activities (such as inmate work, education, and 
recreation) have been increasing, so have negative behaviors such as 
gang activity, infractions, and assaults on staff. Housing has been 
affected with more offenders in double- and triple-bunking and more 
offenders housed in secure units. Prison staffing has increased as a 
likely result, but training and staff qualifications remain about the 
Same over the past few years. The use of gain/good time is already 
declining, as is parole in TIS states (although other forms of 
post-release supervision have increased). It is not possible for us to 
determine what percent of these changes are due to TIS legislation 
itself; however, we see many similar changes in both TIS and non-TIS 
states, suggesting these some of the changes are the result of laws and 
policies in place other than TIS. 
Over the course of the past few years, states reported relatively 
modest use of VOI/TIS funds for private beds. 
numbers of beds built with VOI/TIS funds by the end of 1999 and the 
Table 6.5 presents the 
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number of privately leased beds. 
funds to add beds f o r  violent offenders using this mechanism. 
Fewer than 10 states used VOI/TIS 
I 
22  Texas was not included in significance testing, which applies 
only to TIS States versus non-TIS states. 
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State 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
DC 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
I 11 inoi s 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Mi chi gan 
Minnesota 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Montana 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New Mexico 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
Pennsylvania 
:&ode Island 
south Carolina 
south Dakota 
Table 6.5 
I State Uses of VOI/TIS Funds Through December 31, 1999 
Beds 
Under 
Constructed construction Leased Total 
200 
20 
1240 
0 
175 
0 
48 
600 
0 
2 12 
576 
400 
0 
0 
0 
196 
400 
0 
200 
0 
3 94 
0 
0 
0 
15 
3825 
144 
0 
32 0 
0 
0 
180 
3450 
0 
0 
22 
499 
0 
0 
68 
768 
161 
95 
0 
0 
332 
1164 
580 
0 
1310 
0 
5730 
755 
268 
0 
70 
0 
256 
17 
80 
3 1 0 
0 
0 
0 
2060 
223 
0 
4280 
0 
960 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1500 
192 
240 
1226 
12 1 
50 
2 96 
20 
1164 
0 
373 
213 ' 
0 
0 
0 
150 
0 
0' 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 :  
0 
0 
0 
0 
301 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
500 
0 
0 
0 
0 
46 
12 6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
' 0  
0 ,  
668 
233 
1240 
332 
1339 
580 
198 
0 
5942 
1331 
568 
0 
70 
0 
452 
417 
80 
510 
0 
3 94 
0 
2361 
223 
15 
8105 
144 
960 
320 
0 
500 
180 
4950 
192 
240 
12 94 
746 
0 
2 96 
88 
1932 
161 
1910' 
Tennessee I 170 256 0 426 
(continued on following page) 
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State 
Texas 
Utah 
Vermont 
vi rg ini a 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
wyominq 
Amer. Samoa 
Guam 
N. Marianas 
Puerto Rico 
virqin Islands 
TOTAL 
Beds 
, Under 
Constructed construction Leased Total 
0 382 379 761 
64 72 0 0 784 
0 I61 0 161 
0 0 0 0 
128 0 0 12 8 
186 1.16 0 3 02 
659 3 14 0 973 
0 96 0 96 
66 0 0 66 
0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 12 
0 0 0 0 
64 0 0 64 
15 , 462 25,244 2,088 42 , 794 
HISTORICAL TRENDS IN PRISON MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
We turn now to an historical presentation of these major issues in 
prison management. These data are from the Corrections Yearbook, 
described in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Long Sentences 
Our respondents from the national VOI/TIS survey indicated greater 
numbers of offenders being sentenced for longer periods of time. 
6.1 shows that this has not translated, however, into greater 
Figure 
percentages of offenders having prison sentences of the longest 
length--20 years or more. In fact, the trend seems to be fairly flat 
over the past 10 years, with some decreases overall, and for TIS and 
non-TIS states since the mid 1990s. Texas shows a far greater 
percentage of offenders with sentences of 20 years or more than the 
national average. Indeterminate states generally show lower percentages 
of prisoners with the longest sentences. 
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It may be that the increases reported by states are for sentences 
I 
less than 20 years. 
sentence lengths imposed has ranged between about 60 and 80 months over 
the past decade (Turner et al. 2001) based on data on prison releases 
from the National Correctional Reporting Program. 
This is supported hy the fact that the average 
I 
-+ Non-TIS 45% 
40% *All States 
35% - 
30% - 
25% ! 
- 
- 
oo/o 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
F i g .  6.1 - Percentage of Prisoners with Sentences of 20 Years or More 
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Fig. 6.2 - Percentage of Prisoners with Sentences of 2 0  Years or More, 
by Structured Sentencing 
Special Populations 
One of the concerns about longer sentences is that they will lead 
to a llgraying" of the inmate population. Information on the percentages 
of inmates aged 50 or older reveals increases over the past decade, 
starting before T I S  legislation was enacted in many states. Patterns 
for TIS and non-TIS states, as well as for structured and indeterminate 
sentencing states are very similar, suggesting this trend may be due to 
factors other than sentencing structures (such as the aging of the 
population). Data on the number of offenders with tuberculosis at 
intake, per 1000 inmates shows larger increases in the past several 
years for all states. 
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Fig. 6.3 - Percentage of Offenders Aged 50 and Older (on January 1) 
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+Texas 
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States 40 
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Fig. 6.4 - Inmates w i t h  Tuberculosis at Intake 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
- 5 2  - 
+TIS 
Inmate Classification 
Over the past decade, the percentage of offenders at high/close 
custody level has decreased overall, as well as for TIS and non-TIS 
states. Since 1994, the levels have been fairly constant. TIS states 
generally have larger percentages of offenders in high/close custody 
than do non-TIS states.. Similarly, structured sentencing states 
generally have higher percentages of offenders in high/close custody 
than do indeterminate sentencing states. 
I I 
I 
Fig. 6.5 - Percentage of Inmates at High/Close Custody Level 
costs 
costs have risen for 
exception of Texas, which 
total cost per inmate per 
prisons over the past decade, with the 
has seen decreases in the reported average 
day since the mid 1990s. TIS states report 
the highest costs per day; indeterminate states report higher costs per 
day than structured states; however reported costs are fairly similar 
for all states except Texas. 
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Fig. 6.6 - Average Total Cost per Inmate per D a y  
Crowding 
Prisons are operating over rated capacity, particularly over the 
past several years. 
percentage of rated prison capacity. Texas shows the lowest crowding. 
In Figure 6.7 we present the prison population as a 
Since 1995, structured and indeterminate sentencing states show similar 
patterns, despite differences in the early 1990s. 
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Fig. 6.7 - Prison Population as a Percentage of Rated Prison Capacity, 
by Structured Sentencing 
Safety 
We examined safety by the numbers of inmate misconduct reports, 
assaults of inmates on inmates, and assaults on staff by inmates. The 
number of inmate misconduct reports per inmate has remained relatively 
flat since 1995, except for non-TIS states. For the latter, misconduct 
reports fell from 1994 to 1997 and have been increasing in the past two 
years. 
dramatically for non-TIS states but have remained relatively flat for 
TIS states. Inmate assaults on other inmates have remained relatively 
flat since 1995 for TIS states. Similar to the pattern for inmate 
assaults on staff, non-TIS states have shown large decreases in inmate 
assaults on each other. 
The patterns for inmate assaults on staff have dropped 
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F i g .  6.8 - Number of Inmate Misconduct Reports, per Inmate 
--.TIS 
+ Non-TIS 
+Texas 
*All States 
O !  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
i 
F i g .  6.9 - Inmate Assaults on Staff, per 1000 I~mate8 
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Grievances 
I996 1997 1998 1999 
Inmate Assaults on Other Inmates, per 1000 Inmates 
Similar to assault, the pattern of .inmate.grieva.nces has remained 
relatively flat since 1996. Texas reported grievance rates several 
order of magnitudes larger than the national 
the lowest rates of grievances filed. 
average. TIS states show 
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Pig. 6.11 - Grievances Filed, per 1000 Inmates 
I 
Staf f  Response 
Correctional staff turnover has shown dramatic increases over the 
past decade, nationally, for TIS and non-TIS states, as well as Texas. 
Non-TIS states show the highest rates of correctional staff turnover. 
In recent years, structured sentencing states (figure not shown) have 
shown the highest rates of turnover--from 12 percent in 1997 to almost 
20 percent in 1999. 
correctional officer training appears to have remained relatively flat, 
with some increases during the past few years. Hours of in-service 
correctional officer training (figures not shown here) indicate 
approximately 40 hours of training over the past decade nationally. 
In contrast to turnover, the extent of initial 
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Fig. 6.12 - Percentage of Correctional Officer Turnover' 
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Fig. 6.13 - Hours of Initial Correctional Officer Training Required 
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- 59 - 
Extensive measures of health care were not available in our 
database; however, in addition to the measures of TB mentioned above, we 
were able to examine reported levels of inmates who tested positive for 
HIV as well as those with AIDS. Figure 6.14 shows the rate of inmates 
who tested positive for HIV, per 1000 inmates. From relatively high 
rates in the early 199Os, rates nationally have been declining over the 
past: five years or so. However, rates in Texas have increased during 
the past several years. States with indeterminate sentencing structures 
/ I  
generally show higher rates of HIV as well as AIDS. 
-t TIS 
+- Non-TIS 
12 
*All States 
10 
8 
6 
4 
01 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Fig. 6.14 - Inmates Who Tested Positive for HIV, per 1000 Inmates 
Inmate Programming 
The percentage of inmates assigned to full-time or part-time 
academic or vocational training has fluctuated during the past decade, 
however, the trend appears to be slightly downward. TIS states 
generally show slightly lower rates of participation than non-TIS 
states. Texas shows the lowest rates of participation, with a sharp drop 
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in 1999. The percentage of inmates assigned to prison industry (figure 
not shown) has decreased steadily over the past 10 years, from under 10 
percent to just over 5 percent. 
lower percentages of offenders asdigned than non-TIS states. 
I 
TIS states generally show slightly 
+TIS 
+Non-TIS 
0% 5%% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Fig. 6.15 - Percentage of Inmates Assigned to Full-time or Part-Time 
Academic or Vocational Training 
Summary of National Trends 
Overall, our national analyses suggest one of two patterns. 
Changes in some measures have occurring over the past decade and some 
measures have remained fairly constant. 
for TIS states about the time of many states were passing TIS 
legislation in 1994. In some instances, TIS states show higher levels 
of prison management concerns (such as percent of inmates at high/close 
custody, misconduct reports), but for other variables, non-TIS states 
show higher levels (such as inmate assaults). We did not find strong 
evidence for our hypotheses regarding the potential impact of TIS on 
prison management variables. This may be due to several reasons. 
We do not observe sharp changes 
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Averaging over states in these analyses may mask important state level 
experiences. In addition, data are available only during the first 
several years after TIS legislation was passed in many states. As we 
found in our national VOI/TIS evaluation, we may need to wait several 
more years in order to gauge the impact of such sentencing policies. 
i 
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VII. CASE STUDY PRISON MANAGEMENT FINDIN9S 
In this chapter, we synthesize the information gained from the 
seven case study interviews. We also include selected responses from 
five study states (California, Florida, New York, Texas, and Washington) i that responded to the 1998 American Correctional Association (ACA) ' ,  
survey to supplement information from the intervieiw.23 Findings are 
presented for the major research areas asked of respondents. 
LONG SENTENCES 
States were asked whether they experienced an increase in the 
number of inmates required to serve long sentences with restrictions on 
early release. If so, they were asked to indicate the cause of this 
increase in long-term inmates and whether these inmates share particular 
characteristics, such as youth, violent convictions, dr drug 
convictions. 
All seven of our interviewees reported that sentences had indeed 
become longer within their states.24 The majority of these indicated 
that sentencing lengthening came as the result of either changes in 
sentencing or release policies. For example, Oregon, California, and 
Washington are among the states that have enacted legislation 
lengthening sentences for violent and repeat offenders. Texas has seen 
sentences lengthen largely from a reduction in parole and other early 
release compounded by additional get-tough legislation. In 1994, North 
Carolina adopted structured sentencing, which has actually worked to 
23 North Carolina and Oregon did not respond to the ACA survey, and 
New York responded only to a subset of questions. When reporting on ACA 
survey responses in this chapter, we include only those states that 
responded to a particular question. 
California interviewee referred us to data reported by the state to the 
U.S. Department of Justice. These data indicaeed that sentences had 
been lengthening in California. 
24 In response to the question about length of sentences, our 
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reduce overall admissions because of a reduction in incarceration of 
less serious offenders. Violent and repeat offenders are receiving and 
serving longer sentences than prior to the reform. California, Florida, 
New York, and Washington also reported :Longer sentences in the ACA 
survey, particularly for violent offenders. 
I 
. In fact, all of the interviewees who responded to this question 
indicated that violent offenders were the category of inmates most 
impacted by lengthening sentences.25 In North Carolina, there has been 
a shift to a "more potent" prison population because the share of 
violent offenders has been steadily growing since the adoption of 
structured sentencing. Texas has experienced an increase in youthful 
violent offenders, due in part to legislation lowering the age at which 
juveniles may face adult penalties. However, in the ACA survey, Texas 
reported no overall increase in youthful or juvenile offenders. In 
addition to increases in violent offenders in general, Florida has seen 
a dramatic increase in female inmates convicted for violent and other 
offenders. Our Florida interviewee viewed this partly as a result of a 
greater willingness of judges to send women to prison. 
Washington also reported an increase in female offenders in the ACA 
survey, while California reported a decrease. 
Texas and 
In sum, our interviewees consistently reported that inmates in 
their states are now serving longer sentences than in the past, that 
these changes are largely due to changes in sentencing and early release 
policies, and that violent offenders represent the category of inmate 
most impacted by these changes. These trends are echoed in ACA survey 
responses. 
25 The California interviewee did not provide an answer to this 
question because no analyses of changes in characteristics have yet been 
conducted to inform the response. Our New York interviewee did not 
provide a response to this question. 
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SPECIAL POPULATIONS 
States were asked whether there had been an increase in inmates 
with special needs, such as physical or mental health care, or drug 
treatment. In addition, respondents were asked whether their state 
experienced or is anticipating an increase in older inmates. 
respondents were asked if any preparations or plans were being made for 
the medical care, housing, and/or management o f  this group of inmates. 
If so, 
~ l l  but one of our interviewees (New York) reported that there has 
been an increase in the number or share of inmates with special needs. 
Inmates with mental health needs were described as a major concern by 
most of the interviewees (Oregon, California, Florida, and North 
Carolina).26 
inmates with mental health problems. Some respondents'(Ca1ifornia and 
Florida) suspected that improved methods of screening and identification 
of mental health needs might account for at least some of the observed 
increase in need. In the remaining states (Texas and Washington), the 
special needs population showing the most growth is older inmates. In 
the ACA survey, Florida reported an increase in inmates with physical 
Texas reported in the ACA survey a large increase in 
health problems, and Texas reported a substantial increase. 
When asked specifically about older inmates, all of our 
respondents reported that the share of older inmates in the prison 
population had either increased (California, Florida, New York, Oregon, 
Texas, Washington) or is expected increase in the future (North 
Carolina). In the ACA survey, Texas reported a substantial increase in 
the population of older prisoners. This growth in older inmates was 
explained by all interviewees who responded as a result of sentencing 
policies lengthening sentences and restricting early release.27 The 
. 
26 Our North Carolina respondent classed mental health needs as a 
subcategory of general health care--the need for which has increased in 
recent years. 
27 No explanation for the increase in older inmates was provided by 
our New York respondent. 
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most common accommodation undertaken or planned in response to the 
change has been special housing for older inmates. 
Washington interviewees reported that their states have already 
established special housing facilities for older inmates and our Florida 
interviewee stated that legislation authorizing the construction of such 
a facility had been recently passed. These facilities may provide 
assisted living services and programming appropriate to the abilities of 
I 
Our Texas and 
ageti inmates. 
Oregon and North Carolina, but the present size of the older population 
does; not yet Warrant a Separate facility. 
reported that internal assessment has been underway in recent years in 
preparation for continued growth in the older inmate population. 
have been made for the establishment of a "task groupYto address the 
issue. 
Such facilities have been informal$y discussed in both 
Our Califor,nia interviewee 
Plans 
INMATE CLASSIFICATION 
States were asked if Truth in Sentencing (TIS) or other "get 
tough11 sentencing policies have impacted inmate classification, such as 
how it is conducted, factors considered in determining classification, 
number of classification hearings, or amount of paperwork involved in 
the process. They were asked if there had been a change in the share of 
inmates at each classification level, such as more inmates classified at 
higher custody levels. 
Less than half of our interviewees (three of seven) reported that 
classification has been impacted at least somewhat by TIS and other 
"get-tough" sentencing policies. Our California, Texas, and Washington 
interviewees reported that these policies have impacted classification 
because length of sentence is used in determining classification level. 
This has increased the need for space in more secure facilities and at 
28  Our New 
preparations or 
York interviewee did not report any 
plans for responding to the growing 
specific 
number of older 
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higher custody levels within these facilities. 
interviewee reported a change in the procedures and factors that are 
taken into account in classification committee reviews, such as the 
establishment of different eligibility criteria for earned credit and 
program participation based upon the sentencing status of the inmate. 
Our California 
Paperwork has also increased as a result of additional requirements for 
tracking inmates' status and eligibility for privileges. In the ACA 
survey, none of the study states reported changes in inmate 
classification. 
COSTS 
States were asked whether there had been an increase in the cost 
of incarceration due to TIS or other "get tough" sentencing policies. 
If so, they were asked to indicate in what categories costs have 
increased (for example, total dollars, health care, segregation, 
administration, and programming). 
Most of our interviewees did not directly implicate TIS and other 
"get tough" policies for increased costs within their state's 
correctional system. Generally, the respondents indicated that recent 
policy changes have occurred within a context of an increasing prison 
population, making it difficult to sort out independent influences. 
Several interviewees (California, Florida, North Carolina, and 
Washington) mentioned the potential for future cost increases, 
particularly due to the health care and other special needs of older 
inmates incarcerated due to "get tough" sentencing policies. Our 
Washington interviewee described one potential method for controlling 
costs associated with aging inmates, termed extraordinary medical 
placement. 
eligible for other sources of support (such as social security) a form 
of furlough that allows them to receive care in a less-costly community 
This method is to grant medically needy inmates who are 
inmates in that state. 
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setting. 
inmates, but is expected to produce some overall cost'savings. 
This option is available for only some categories of long-term 
I 
The need for new construction was also a cost that was discussed 
as relating either directly or indirectly to changes in sentencing 
policy. our Florida, Oregon, New York, and North Carolina interviewees 
mentioned that recent sentencing policy changes have contributed to the 
need for more prison space or are projected to do so in the future. 
, ,  
1 
CROWDING 
States were asked whether prisons had become more crowded in 
recent years. If so, they were asked how much of the crowding they felt 
was due to TIS or other "get tough" policies. They were asked how these 
policies make prisons more crowded (for example, limiting early release, 
sentencing more inmates to prison, sentencing inmates to longer terms). 
They were also asked whether it has become necessary to grant (or has 
consideration been given to granting) ea.rly release to some inmates to 
make room for long-term or higher risk inmates. 
All but two of our respondents (California and New York) reported 
that crowding was either currently a problem or is expected to grow in 
the future due to "get tough" sentencing policies. Our New York 
interviewee described an effort over the past six years to add maximum 
security capacity and divert lower risk offenders that is Viewed as 
successful in controlling crowding. Our California respondent reported 
that California prisons are currently operating above capacity, but 
indicated that state data did not reveal a relationship between crowding 
and TIS and other sentencing policies. 
survey that double- and triple-bunking had increased by about 2 percent 
because of VOI/TIS. 
Washington reported in the A m  
Oregon, North Carolina, and Washington are currently experiencing 
a reprieve from crowding. Both our Oregon and Washington respondents 
described recent construction efforts that have alleviated crowding 
problems the states had been experiencing. In North Carolina, according 
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to our respondent, the reprieve is due to a structured sentencing scheme 
adopted by the state in 1994. Under it, low-level offenders are no 
longer sentenced to prison so many previously used prison beds are 
currently available. All three states consider the present situation to 
be temporary and anticipate increased crowded conditions as more inmates 
are sentenced under TIS and related policies. 
1 
In Texas, our respondent reported a struggle with crowding 
throughout the past decade. New capacity and use 'of private facilities 
has reduced the problem somewhat, but the present sentencing policies 
are expected to produce a return to the high levels of crowding the 
state experienced prior to the new construction. Within Florida, 
crowded conditions are a particular problem within facilities that house 
special populations. Our respondent reported that get-tough policies 
have added to the numbers of females and youths in the prison 
population--groups requiring separation from the rest of the population. 
Construction has not kept pace with the growth in these populations and 
crowded conditions are expected to worsen in the future with the 
addition of more inmates. 
Most of our interviewees (California, Florida, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Texas, and Washington) reported that early release is not 
granted to some inmates to make room for long-term or higher risk 
inmates. our North Carolina respondent added, "the public would not 
stand for that." 
California, Florida, and Washington reported a decrease in good 
In response to questions on the ACA survey, 
. time/gain time, while Texas reported no change. Some interviewees did 
report efforts to divert some inmates from prison beds. Our New York 
respondent described the diversion of lvlow level" drug offenders from 
prison to treatment programs and the availability of a boot camp program 
for qualifying non-violent first-time offenders. Washington also 
operates a diversionary boot camp program and a "work ethic" camp. Our 
respondent reported that the programs arc not currently operating at 
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full capacity, due to a lack of inmate volunteers who meet program 
eligibility requirements. 
SAFETY 
States were asked whether there has been a change in the safety of 
prisons, such as an increase in inmate-on-inmate or inmate-on-staff 
assaults. If the level of safety has changed, respondents were asked 
how much of this seems to be related to TIS or other "get tough" 
policies. 
procedures or policies regarding the use of force have been considered 
or implemented. 
They were also asked if additional safety and training 
Our interviewees were split in their responses about safety. Both 
our New York and Oregon respondents reported safer facilities today 
relative to the past. In New York, this was attributed to construction 
that increased the capacity to segregate disruptive inmates. Our Oregon 
interviewee stated that the state has yet to determine why assault rates 
have decreased over the past two years. 
that in the past, inexperienced staff, particularly those in new 
institutions, had not yet acquired the skills necessary to control 
One possible explanation is 
inmate behavior. The declining rates of assault may indicate increases 
in staff ability to maintain order. 
Both Florida and Washington have not generally experienced any 
change in prison safety. Our Florida respondent reported that state 
data do show an increase in both inmate-on-inmate and inmate-on-staff 
assault, but these can be attributed to the adoption of a standardized 
reporting format, rather than a reflection of inmate behavior. 
Safety has declined in the prisons of California, North Carolina, 
and Texas, according to our interviewees and the ACA survey.29 Inmates 
29 Our California respondent did not provide a response because 
there have been no analyses of the relationship between safety and 
sentencing policies. In the ACA survey, California reported an increase 
in assaults on staff but declined to attribute the change to VOI/TIS. 
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in both North Carolina and Texas were described as more violent and 
difficult to control. Our Texas interviewee attributed this to get 
tough policies that remove early release incentives for good behavior 
within prisons. In the ACA survey, Texas reported a substantial 
increase in assaults on staff. 
, 
1 
Additional safety and training procedures or policies regarding 
, ,  
the use of force have been implemented in some states. Our California, 
Oregon, and Washington respondents reported that sAfety training has 
increased as a component of general training in response to the growth 
of the prison population--not in response to concerns 'about a more 
violent population. Conversely, respondents from North Carolina and 
Texas stated that training for staff has increased as a result of 
concerns about the nature of the prison population. For example, Texas 
has increased its training in hostage negotiation, and North Carolina 
has expanded training in extracting non-cooperative inmates from 
cells.30 Florida reported in the ACA survey that staff training had 
increased. 
OR1 EXANCES 
States were asked whether there has been an increase in inmate 
grievances. 
"get tough" policies might be responsible for this. 
They were asked to indicate to what extent TIS and other 
In the majority of states, the number of grievances was described 
as unchanged (Florida, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas) or down from 
previous years (New York). Only our California and Washington 
interviewees reported an increase in inmate grievances. Both 
respondents did not consider TIS and other get-tough policies to be 
responsible of the increase. Our Washington respondent stated that 
there is a relationship between change in the routine maintained within 
30 Our Florida and New York respondents did not provide information 
about staff training on use of force. 
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a facility and grievances. Thus, greater times of change generate , 
higher levels of grievances. 
1 
I 
STAFF RESPONSE 
States were asked to indicate whether staff workloads or schedules 
changed as a result of TIS or other "get tough" policies. They were 
asked whether changes in the composition of the prison population have 
affected staff morale, stress levels, absenteeism, attitudes, turnover, 
disability claims, or retirement levels. In addition, respondents were 
asked whether correctional officers' associations or unions sought to 
make any changes, such as increased safety training or staffing levels. 
I 
, 
While changes in workloads and schedules for staff working within 
state prisons were reported, no interviewees attributed these changes to 
TIS (31 other get-tough policies. Heavier workloads were reported (North 
Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington), but these were attributed to 
high vacancy levels and staff turnover brought on by strong state 
economies and low pay for correctional officers.31 Requirement of 
overtime work was a factor mentioned by our North Carolina and Texas 
interviewees that increases staff stress and increases turnover. In an 
effort to address this issue, North Carolina is pilot testing a new work 
schedule in some of its facilities. Shifts have been extended to 12 
hours in order to condense the workweek, which reduces the number of 
times staff must commute per month and makes is easier for staff to 
secure a second job to supplement low pay. To date, staff response has 
been very positive and no adverse impact on facility operation has been 
observed. 
In Florida, our interviewee described inmate idleness as a major 
cause of low staff morale and increasing stress levels. Since the 
3l Our Oregon respondent described this as a regional issue. 
Filling staff vacancies and reducing staff turnover is more of a 
challenge in the rural Eastern region of the state than in the urban and 
suburban Western region. 
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legislature prohibited the purchase of recreation equipment, boredom has 
become a problem for both staff and inmates. As a result, the latter 
were described as more difficult to control. The correctional union in 
Florida lobbied against the legislation in anticipation of these 
problems, but was unsuccessful. Correctional unions in both Oregon and 
Washington have lobbied for increased staffing levels. 
states did not report special activities on the part of correctional 
unions or associations. Texas reported in the ACA survey that staff 
qualifications had decreased, while the number of staff had 
substantially increased. 
The remaining 
HEALTH CARE 
States were asked to indicate the major health concerns among the 
state's prison population. 
other "get tough'' policies have influenced these concerns (for example 
the availability of, or access to, care or treatment for assault 
injuries). 
testing inmates for TB and HIV; and whether there had been an increase 
in the share of inmates infected with TS or HIV. 
They were asked whether they felt TIS or 
They were also asked to indicate the state's policies for 
The major health concerns described by our interviewees were 
hepatitis C (California, Florida, Oregon, North Carolina, Texas), 32 HIV 
(Florida, Oregon, Texas), tobacco (North Carolina), mental illness 
(Florida, washington), dental hygiene (Washington) and special needs of 
older inmates (Florida, Oregon, Texas, Washington) . 3 3  Our California 
and Washington interviewees view TIS ana other get tough policies as 
contributors to health concerns because these policies lengthen the 
Though it is considered the major health care concern, our North 
Carolina respondent stated that hepatitis C has not yet become a problem 
within the prison population. 
North Carolina expects to face the disease in the near future and is 
taking proactive steps to reduce its impact. 
state's major inmate health concerns. 
Based on the experience of other states, 
33 Our New York respondent did not provide information on the 
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sentences of inmates with chronic conditions. None of our interviewees 
saw any other implications of get tough policies for inmate health care. 
All respondents reported that inmates are tested at intake for 
, 
TB . 34 Our California respondent skated that inmates are also routinely 
tested for TB before being transferred between institutions. With the 
exception of Oregon, all respondents reported that H I V  testing occurs at 
the request of an inmate or medical personnel. Our Oregon respondent 
reported that all inmates receive H I V  testing at intake. 
INMATE PROGRAMMING 
States were asked whether changes i.n sentencing policy or changes 
in prison populations (if any) have affected the type or availability of 
programming, such as work, education, and treatment opportunities. 
Only one respondent (Oregon) indicated that the type and 
availability of programming has been impacted in recent years by changes 
in the prison population. Dramatic growth has outpaced the ability of 
the state to establish meaningful programming for large numbers of new 
inmates. Efforts within the state have focused on increasing 
programming designed to improve release preparation and to involved 
inmates in statutorily mandated work programs. In the ACA survey, 
however, Washington reported increases in the percentage of inmates who 
work regularly and those being educated regularly. All four states that 
responded (California, Florida, Texas, and Washington) reported an 
increase in inmate drug treatment programs, with California reporting a 
substantial increase. Except for Texas, the same states also reported 
an increase in drug testing, as did New York, and again California's 
' increase was described as substantial. Texas reported no change in drug 
testing. Washington estimated that VOI/TIS accounted for a 5 percent 
34 Our Texas respondent 
policy for TB testing. 
did not provide information on the state's 
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increase in drug testing. No other state attributed any of the 
programming changes specifically to VOI/TIS. 
1 
UTILIZATION OF PRIVATE PRISON FACILITIES 
AS noted in the previous chapter (see Table 6.51, in our  national 
evaluation of the VOI/TIS Incentive Grant Program, we found that the use 
of leased beds has been relatively small. By the end of 1999, over 
15,000 new beds had been constructed and an additional 2 5 , 0 0 0  were under 
construction, while only about 2,000 beds had been leased. Eight states 
(Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, and 
Texas) reported using VOI/TIS funds for leasing beds. 
Moreover, from our ACA survey, we find little relationship between 
voI/TIS and other "get tough" policies a.nd the use of VOI/TIS funding to 
lease beds from private correctional facilities. Texas reported a 
substantial increase (more than 50 percent) in leasing of beds at the 
state level due to the utilization of VOI/TIS funds. Yet Texas was not 
a TIS state, and as will be seen in the next chapter, its use of leased 
beds was atypical. 
beds, nor did any (including Texas) report leasing beds for local 
correctional facilities, e.g., jails. 
No other study state reported an increase in leased 
In the next chapter we utilize case studies of three states 
(Florida, North Carolina, and Texas) to (explore in more detail the use 
of private correctional facilities. 
i 
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4 VIII. 
DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE 
Privatization of 
PRIVATIZATION CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
/ I  
STATE PRISONS 
state prisons was initiated in Florida, North 
Carolina, and Texas during periods when the prison systems in all three 
case-study states were struggling with high rates of population growth 
and serious problems with overcrowded facilities. Policy-makers in 
these states expected that privatization would provide speedy expansion 
of prison capacity, and would do so at a lower cost for both prison 
construction and operation. 
The fledgling private prison industry entered two states, Texas 
and Florida, early on. CCA received its very first government contract 
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1984 to operate a 
private INS Ifprocessing center" in Houston, Texas. Privatization by CCA 
of the local jail in Panama City, Florida in 1985 was hailed, 
nationally, as one of the first private sector success stories. 
Contracts for privately-operated state prisons would come later in these 
states. The first four private prisons in Texas opened in 1989. The 
first in Florida, a prison for women, was opened in 1995. It was not 
until late in 1998 that the first private state prison in North Carolina 
would be ramped-up for business. 
THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE PRISON DEVELOPMENT IN TEXAS 
The Texas legislature enacted legislation to authorize 
privatization of prisons in 1987 during a period when both the prison 
population and correctional costs were skyrocketing in the state. After 
a massive class action lawsuit was brought in federal court near the end 
of the 1970s to challenge prison conditions, the state had been obliged 
to increase spending on correctional services. The per diem cost for 
prison operations in Texas was just $13 ILn 1980; by 1990 per diem costs 
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, surpa S d $40. Many st te policymakers 3w privatizz ion as an avenue 
to expanded prison capacity at a lower cost. 
The legislature authorized four private state prisons, and 
/ I  
appropriated $30 million for this purpose. In 1991 the legislature 
voted to expand the scope of privatization, authorizing construction of 
an additional 2000 beds. Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) 
officials negotiated contracts for two Mew 500-bed prisons, and 500-bed 
expansions were provided at existing institutions. The Institutional 
Division is currently responsible for 79 of 105 TDCJ facilities. of 
these, private vendors under contract to the Institutional Division 
operate six facilities. 
The Texas State  Jai l  System 
A new round of private prison contracting by TDCJ was initiated 
when, in 1993, the "State Jail" system was created. The Texas 
legislature had adopted sweeping sentencing law revisions that year 
which established a new category of criminal offenses designated as 
"State Jail Felonies." The intention of the reform was to divert 
offenders who might otherwise end up in regular state prisons, and to 
keep them close to their homes and community support systems. State 
Jails are completely distinct from local. county jails, having been 
established by Texas policy-makers specifically for confinement of State 
Jail Felons--relatively less serious drug and property offenders with 
little or no prior criminal records who could be sentenced to up to two 
years in these new minimum-security facilities. 
The State Jail system currently consists of 17 facilities, ranging 
in size from 667 to 2216 beds. Of the 3.7 State Jails, five are 
privately operated. The Wackenhut Corrections Corporation and the 
Management and Training Corporation operate two facilities each, with 
the remaining facility operated by the Corrections Corporation of 
America. 
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Other TDCJ Contracts for Private Prison Beds 
In addition to the private prisons discussed in this report--the 
six private prisons under contract with the Institutional Division, and 
the five private State Jails under contract with the State Jail 
Division--TDCJ maintains contracts for other private prison beds. The 
/ I  
parole Division has contracts for 4,711 private beds in nine facilities, 
including one private prison operated by Wackenhut at Lockhart, Texas. 
The Institutional Division also leases 3,578 private beds in seven local 
private facilities in order to avoid crowding in the state institutions. 
Taken together, the 19,245 private beds under contract with TDCJ 
comprise 12 percent of TDCJ capacity, which currently totals 155,512 
beds (Texas Department of Criminal Justice February 28, 2001; Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice December 20, 2000). 
, DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE PRISONS IN FLORIDA 
Seeking to attain 'Itruth in sentencing" and to reduce sentencing 
disparity, the Florida Legislature adopted a system of determinate 
guideline sentencing in 1983 and ended parole release, although 
sentences were still reduced one-third through "gain time." Admissions 
to prison began to rise dramatically in the late 1980s, nearly doubling 
from 22,512 in FY87 to a high of 43,330 in FY90 (Florida Economic and 
Demographic Research 2000). In 1988 new sentencing laws were introduced 
to provide tougher penalties for "habitual" and violent offenders. But 
until 1994, prison population growth was somewhat controlled through a 
series of administrative mechanisms for early release (administrative 
gain time, provisional credits, and control release). In 1994 the 
sentencing guidelines were restructured .in an effort to conserve prison 
bed space. Gain time was eliminated, and by the end of the year, 
control release was almost eliminated. 
Faced with a steep prison population growth curve in 1989, the 
legislature moved to authorize the Florida Department of Corrections 
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(DOC) to contract for both private construction and private operation of 
prisons. Chapter 89-526 specified that private prisons would have to 
produce "substantial savings" but the legislature did not set a specific 
benchmark for cost savings. Reluctant DOC officials moved very slowly 
toward contracting for construction of the state's first private prison. 
I 
Frustrated that the private prison contracting process had 
remained mired for so long in a myriad of difficulties, the legislature 
set up a completely separate private prison contracting agency. 
93-406 of Florida statutes, enacted in 1993, created the Correctional 
privatization Commission (CPC) , a f ive-member board appointed by the 
Governor. 
Chapter 
While the CPC is housed within the state Department of 
Management Services, it is functionally independent of that agency, and 
from the DOC. 
The Florida prison system currently consists of 128 correctional 
facilities comprised of prisons, work and forestry camps, work release 
centers, and drug treatment centers. Currently the prison system houses 
more than 71,000 prisoners but has excess capacity and is maintaining a 
huge bed surplus. 
reserve without staffing to reduce per diem costs and increase 
operational efficiency. The institutional system includes 52 prisons 
managed by the Department of Corrections and five that are privately 
Specifically, 6,317 prison beds are being held in 
contracted through the CPC. 
PRIVATE PRISON DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 
In 1988, under a federal court order to reduce overcrowding, an 
emergency release law had been enacted by the North Carolina legislature 
in order to limit the state's prison population level within a 
population trcap.'t The prison cap bill called for early release of 
prisoners to keep the population under agreed-upon capacity limits. 
Under the emergency release System, some of the state's prisoners would 
serve as little as one-eighth of their sentence. 
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I In 1989 the legislature had directed an ambitious program of 
prison expansion, authorizing use of bonds to fund prison construction. 
Between 1990 and 1999, North Carolina would spend $336 million on prison 
expansion. By 1993 the state's policymakers were also poised to 
introduce a sweeping reform designed to replace the early-release 
provisions with a sentencing structure designed to keep prison 
populations within the expanding prison capacity limits. 
/ I  
North Carolina's "Structured Sentencing Law'' was enacted in 1993, 
and took effect in October of 1994. The: new system incorporated 
truth-in-sentencing by requiring that prisoners serve at least 8 5  
percent of the sentence imposed. The sentencing guidelines were designed 
to take account of the anticipated expansion through use of a computer 
simu:lation model. The sophisticated program was used to set sentence 
ranges designed to ration the states correctional resources in a fashion 
I consistent with the added confinement capacity authorized by the 
legislature. 
But before the sentencing reforms could bring prison population 
growth under control, the highly-publicized murder of basketball star 
Michael Jordan's father in the summer of 1993 by a parolee shocked North 
Carolinians and brought the early-release practice under intense fire. 
Managers at North Carolina's Department of Corrections (DOC) responded 
by tightening the release valve. 
moving too slowly to absorb the resulting population increase and so DOC 
managers began a search for private prison beds located in other states 
to house the overflow of prisoners (Associated Press October 23 1993). 
The prison construction program was 
After North Carolina had shipped hundreds of prisoners to private 
out-of-state prisons, the concept of prison privatization w i t h i n  the 
state jumped to the foreground. During the 1995 legislative session 
House leaders injected privatization into the administration's 
already-robust prison building effort. Funding for two 500-bed 
medium-security private prisons was approved that year. The two private 
prisons were embraced by the administration as a "pilot project," a 
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chance to test whether they would save tax dollars (Associated Press I 
January 2, 1996). 
I 
out-of-state housing was seen as both a stopgap and a trade-of€ 
that would solve the temporary prison-bed short-fall. At the height of 
the prison population crunch, North Carolina exported upwards of 2,000 
prisoners to four private prisons in other states at an annual cost of 
$20 million (Rawlins October 17, 1999). The state's experience with 
contracting for out-of-state prison beds was mixed, at best. 
Correctional services obtained from Copell Corrections in Rhode island 
were satisfactory, but very expensive compared to costs in North 
i 
I 
I 
Carolina. Contracts with CCA for beds in Hinton, Oklahoma and Mason, 
Tennessee were more economical, but presented other difficulties. 
\ 
MANAGEMENT OF PRIVATE PRISONS 
A review of the management experience in the case, study states 
brings to light many interesting issues about the risks inherent in the 
undertaking, and suggests the difficulties that public correctional 
administrators face as they struggle to manage those risks. 
Responsibility for Management of Private Prisons 
AS is the case in all the states that contract for private prison 
beds except Florida, private prison contracting and management has been 
the responsibility of the agencies that manage public state prisons. As 
has been discussed above, Florida legislators became frustrated with the 
level of resistance to privatization they encountered within the state's 
Department of Corrections, and set up a separate, independent agency, 
the Correctional Privatization Commission, to facilitate the contracting 
and management of the state's private prisons. 
The North Carolina Department of Corrections channeled 
responsibility for private prisons to an already-existing contracts 
administration unit within the Division of Prisons. Direct 
responsibility for management and oversight fell to the Assistant 
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Director of Auxiliary Services--who carried these responsibilities from 
the initiation of the first contracts with private prisons in Rhode 
Island, Texas, Oklahoma, and Tennessee to hold overflow prisoners in the 
early 199Os, to the conversion to public management of two North 
I 
Carolina CCA-managed prisons on October 12000. 
In addition to the Assistant Director, a variety of other central 
DOC staff carried responsibilities related to operation of the CCA 
prisons. 
the private prisons. They monitored case management functions as' well 
as the maintenance of accurate and prompt entry of data in the Offender 
population Unified System (OPUS). Grievances filed by prisoners would 
be investigated and resolved by DOC staff if they were not quickly 
settled. All classification-level promotions and demotions required 
approval by DOC central staff. DOC staff performed pre-employment 
background investigations including criminal history checks for all 
prospective private prison employees. 
DOC staff would schedule the transfer of prisoners to and from 
' ,  
The Texas Department of Criminal Justice had split up 
responsibility for these functions, with the Assistant Director €or 
Contract Management in the Institutions Division carrying responsibility 
for contracts with six private prisons holding general population 
prisoners, as well as for extra capacity beds in seven 
privately-operated local facilities. Until recently, contracting and 
managing the five private State Jails was handled by staff in the State 
Jails Division who also managed those directly operated by TDCJ.35 Nine 
more private facilities hold prisoners under the authority of the Parole 
Division, which has a "Specialized Programs" unit that has managed 
contracts with both for-profit and non-profit companies to provide 
pre-parole transfer facilities, intermediate sanction facilities, 
multi-use facilities, halfway houses, work program facilities, county 
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jail beds, residential substance abuse <services, and a variety of 
non-residential services. Our report is focused on the Institutions 
Division and State Jail contract facilities. 
Florida remains the only state that has created a body entirely 
separate from their correctional services agency for the sole purpose of 
contracting for private construction and operation of prisons. 
According to the executive director of the Correctional Privatization 
Commission (CPC) , the "politics of privatization" have impeded 
replication of the model elsewhere. 
The CPC has been a lightning rod for controversy in Florida. 
Exclusion of any representation from the DOC on the Commission means 
that the state's correctional services agency has no input as to where 
private prisons will be built, or for what custody levels they will be 
designed. The CPC effectively obligates the DOC to place prisoners in 
private facilities without review or agteement as to their design 
specifications or staffing plans (Office of Program Policy Analysis and 
Government Accountability 1995). 
The decision to establish a separate CPC has resulted in dual 
corrections administrations. The CPC is seen by many state officials as 
a "mini DOC," and is widely perceived as an avid proponent for 
privist ization. 
Contracting for Private Prisons at TDCJ 
Fourteen years of experience with contracting and oversight of 
private prisons by TDCJ's Institutions Division has produced a highly 
professional team of managers and a model set of procedures for managing 
the risks inherent with the undertaking. The Institutional Division 
contracting process is framed by a highly detailed request for proposals 
35 In a major reorganization currently underway, this 
responsibility is now being shifted to the Institutions Division, as is 
responsibility for the secure facilities that have until now been 
contracted and managed by staff in the Parole Division. 
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spec if I 
I ,  
the exact provi ic that will , ' i  
The contracting philosophy is that private prison vendors should 
lldo it our way." The contracting strategy is to hold them accountable 
to clear and precise standards for contract performance. TDCJ 
contractors are obliged to maintain conf'ormity with every applicable 
TDCJ policy, as well as the policies established by the Windham School 
District (educational program from inmates) , unless prior written 
I 
approval of proposed alternative policies is obtained from TDCJ.36' 
Requests for approval of optional policies have not occurred during the 
contracting process, but arise later as particular operational issues 
crop up. 
I 
Bidders for contracts are requested to propose a'level and quality 
of program services at least equal to those provided in public prisons, 
and to provide these at a lower cost than incurred by public operation. 
Bidders are instructed to provide detailed information about all 
operational costs they would propose (direct, indirect, and profit 
margin). 
aspects of proposed prison operations, as well as procedures for 
self--monitoring; proposed procedures for turning over of operations in 
Detailed operational plans are also required covering all 
the event of bankruptcy or inability to perform contract duties; 
emergency security procedures; an organizational chart and staffing 
plans with accompanying job descriptions, salary ranges, qualifications, 
and job duties required. 
The contractor cannot retain upper level management staff for 
employment without prior approval by TDCJ officials. The staff training 
curriculum for private prisons must be approved, and the number of hours 
of academy and in-service training must be equivalent to those provided 
to public prison staff. 
36 Contractors are free to establish their own operational and 
management procedures to accomplish TDCJIs established goals as 
expressed in its policy statements. 
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To safeguard the liberty interests of prisoners, Texas statutes 
I 
limit the delegation of authority from TDCJ to private prison 
contractors in certain areas. For example, TDCJ retains the 
responsibility for computation of release and parole eligibility dates; 
the awarding of "good time" credits; the approval of furloughs or 
pre-parole transfers; and classification decisions that would place a 
prisoner in less restrictive custody status. 
i' 
Determination of routine disciplinary matte& may be delegated to 
the private prison staff. However, private prison staff are obligated 
to report disciplinary infractions (and as well, good 'behavior) to TDCJ 
officials. The private prison officials may make recommendations, but 
hearings on major disciplinary violations (those which might affect the 
duration of a prisoner's time in prison) are conducted only by TDCJ 
staff . 
When a prisoner is suspected of a major disciplinary infraction, 
the specifics of the case are provided to the TDCJ morktor who 
determines if the case is major, i.e., one that might result in 
administrative segregation or affect the length of the prisoner's term 
of incarceration. When cases such as these arise, the prisoner 
transferred to a public prison for a hearing, where he or she likely to 
remain, regardless of the outcome. If the infraction is not determined 
to be major, a variety of sanctions may be imposed at the discretion of 
private prison staff, including restricted access to recreation, 
commissary, or visitation. 
Enforcement of policies given particular importance by TDCJ are in 
areas that have given rise to inmate grievances and legal action. 
Contracts delegate limited powers to private prison staff. Use of force 
by contract employees is restricted to that which is necessary for 
self-defense; for restraining prisoners who present an llimminent and 
immediate threat" to others; to prevent serious damage to property; to 
maintain or regain control "in the event of a mutiny, rebellion, riot, 
or disturbance,Il or to isolate or confine a prisoner in enforcement of 
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prison rules and regulations, "where lesser means have proven 
ineffective." Deadly force (use of firearms) is restricted to 
situations presenting threat of serious injury to an individual; to 
prevent escapes; or where lesser means have failed to quell a mutiny, 
rebellion, riot, or disturbance. 
Access to state and federal courts, to legal counsel, and to 
public officials and agencies is intended to be available for all 
private prisoners. Prison law libraries must contain all resources 
required under court orders and TDCJ rules. Services are to be provided 
to prisoners by a licensed attorney under a sub-contract with the 
private prison company. 
implement TDCJ's grievance procedure and provide all necessary 
resources. 
Private. prison contractors are obliged to 
SELECTION AND TRANSFER OF PRISONERS TO PRIVATE PRISONS 
Texas' recent experience with the private prisons has been 
relatively problem-free. TDCJ officials believe that the key factor in 
managing the risks associated with private prison contracting is careful 
screening and selection of private prisoners. 
prisoners may be confined in private prison under Texas statutes, the 
Institutions Division Administrator for Contract Facility Operations 
reports that TDCJ officials have never contracted private beds for 
While medium custody 
prisoners above the minimum custody level, believing that safe 
management of medium custody prisoners requires a more labor-intensive 
staffing plan than private vendors offer. 
To be considered for transfer to a private prison, an inmate must 
be classified at the minimum custody level, with no recent major 
disciplinary infractions. Mental health status is taken into account in 
screening, since TDCJ officials believe that private prisons do not 
provide the best environment for such inmates. 
In Florida, most of the prisoners transferred to private prisons 
are classified to the medium or minimum custody levels. The DOC 
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managers that handle this function also stress the necessity for careful 
screening of candidates for transfer. 
prisons are perceived by most state officials to be more program-rich 
I 
The CPC-contracted private 
than DOC institutions, functioning more or less as pre-release 
facilities for lower custody-level prisoners who are clQser to release 
than the general population in DOC institutions (Florida Corrections 
Commission 1996). For example, many prisoners may be assigned to 
private prisons for less than one year before being sent to work release 
or being released to their home communities. 
1 
I 
Decisions about what prisoners to transfer to private prisons, 
their classification levels, the disciplinary actions taken against 
them, application of gain time rules, or any other matters that would 
affect the custody or release of prisoners are determihed by DOC staff, 
who retain responsibility under Florida law for any decisions affecting 
the liberty interests of the prisoners transferred to' private prisons. 
Transfer decisions are made according to available bed capacity at 
appropriate classification levels, determination of medical and 
psychological needs, and treatment and training requirements. Medical 
treatment needs also considered, since medical costs are capped in 
private facilities. In addition, Florida DOC makes an effort to 
 cluster^^ prisoners with certain types of medical problems (e.g., heart 
condi.tions) in public institutions where they can provide a 
concentration of medical specialists and provide treatment and 
medications at the least cost (Florida Corrections Commission 2000). 
Generally, if prisoners develop costly health problems, or engage 
in behavior resulting in classification to a higher custody level, they 
are transferred to the public prison system. According to Florida DOC 
classification staff, major differences between public and private 
prison operations in result from dissimilarities in the prisoner 
population. The private prisons house healthier, better behaved, 
lower-cost inmates. 
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The North Carolina DOC contracted with CCA for ope ation of the 
I r 
two private prisons. All prisoners sent to CCA's prisons would be 
screened and selected by central administrative DOC staff to assure that 
DOC institutional managers did not attempt to transfer problem inmates. 
Selection of prisoners for transfer to and from private prisons was done 
according to established criteria that were shaped by their prior 
experience with contracting for private prison beds in other states. 
To be eligible for transfer to private prisons, medium custody 
I 
prisoners had to be able to work or maintain a program assignment'on a 
full-time basis. They must have maintained a good behavioral record, 
I 
pose no escape risk, and have no serious medical or psychiatric 
treatment needs. Eligible prisoners were allowed to volunteer for 
transfer. 
Significant misconduct, such as serious violence and attempted 
escape, would normally result in transfer back to a North Carolina 
public facility. Transfer would also occur if a prisoner was 
reclassified to a higher or lower custody status, or if they developed a 
serious medical or psychiatric need. After six months of assignment to 
a private prison, prisoners with a good institutional behavior record 
may request to transfer to a public facility. 
MONITORING AND CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 
The most artfully written contract may be undermined in the 
absense of close oversight and effective enforcement of the terms. The 
experience in the case study states reveals how much effort may be 
required to execute these challenging functions. 
Overaight in Texas 
Five of six private prisons under contract in Texas have a 
full-time on-site monitor responsible for assessing contract 
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compliance.37 
monitoring and auditing all prison operations. 
to cover contract compliance issues as well as compliance with policies, 
ACA standards, state laws, and applicable court orders. Reports cover 
all aspects of prison operations. 
The monitor functions under TDCJ-devised procedures for 
Monitoring is designed 
Detailed plans for self-monitoring of operations and assessing the 
success of rehabilitation programs must be submitted for TDCJ approval. 
The program assessment plan is supposed to contain clearly defined 
goals, outputs, and measurable outcomes related to the objectives of the 
program. A private prison contractor must develop an information system 
capable of tracking and evaluating the achievement of outcomes. 
An extensive schedule of reports is also required to document 
operational performance and service delivery, ranging from a weekly 
"Vacant Position Report,I1 and a monthly report on delivery of healthcare 
services, down to a quarterly "Aluminum Can Sales Report.I1 
Private prison contracts establish TDCJ's right to audit, inspect, 
and test all operations and services required under the contract, and 
require 'Ireasonably promptq1 access to all financial, employee, and 
prisoner records maintained by the contractor without limitation. 
Monitoring may also include audits by TDCJ administrative staff and 
representatives of the Windham School District. The contractor must 
allow entry to the prison facility at all times for state legislators 
and executive officials, members of the judicial branch, and all 
authorized investigators, auditors, emplloyees or agents of TDCJ and the 
Texas Board of Criminal Justice. 
In event of non-compliance with contract provisions, a private 
prison contractor is notified of the specifics, and given 20 days to 
resolve the issue. Within that time limit, private prison managers must 
37 The B.M. Moore Correctional Center in Overton is located about 
ten miles from the privately-operated Bradshaw State Jail in Henderson. 
Both facilities are managed by the same contractor and the t w o  
facilities share a single monitor. 
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file a written response, detailing the steps and methods that have been 
taken to come back into compliance. 
While monetary sanctions are available to enforce contract 
requirements, TDCJ managers do not conceive of these as liquidated 
damages or penalties taken against vendors. They are unwilling to pay 
for services that have not been delivered, however, and have sometimes 
withheld significant amounts of money where this has occurred. 
Failure to meet contract obligations within defined timeframes 
will result in specified monetary withholdings, absent extensions 
granted by TDCJ officials. Money may also be deducted by TDCJ when the 
contractor fails to meet and maintain acceptable performance standards. 
Oversight in Florida 
Responsibility for monitoring and contract enforcement in Florida 
currently rests with the Correctional Privatization Commission. Chapter 
957 of Florida Law requires that private prisons must seek and obtain 
accreditation under American Correctional Association (ACA) standards, 
as well as all state laws and applicable court orders. The CPC set up a 
system of on-site monitoring in each of its contract facilities. 
monitors are provided with an office at the facility, and are expected 
to submit monthly reports. Until recently, these reports were augmented 
by annual monitoring visits by an independent contract monitoring team. 
CPC 
Authority for monitoring Florida's private prisons has been a bone 
of contention between the DOC and the CPC. The DOC Office of the 
Inspector General conducts biennial management reviews of public prisons 
that cover a wide range of issues. In 1997 the DOC announced it would 
also conduct management reviews at private prisons but CPC managers 
resisted, arguing that such reviews would be redundant. They pointed 
out that under Florida law, their facilities were not subject to DOC 
rules or policies to the extent that such were Ilinconsistent with the 
mission of the commission to establish cost-effective, privately 
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operated correctional facilities" (Florida Corrections Commission 
1996).38 The DOC retains limited authority for audits and inspections. 
Early in 2000 the Florida Corrections Commission (FCC) became 
concerned about whether an adequate level of monitoring was being 
conducted by CPC staff at the private prisons. FCC investigators 
requested copies of the monthly monitoring reports for all facilities 
operating under CPC contracts. The primary concern they raised after 
review of these documents was about large gaps in' reporting during 
periods of many months' duration at three facilities due to on-site 
monitor positions being vacant. 
FCC staff has also raised a number of other issues related to 
inconsistent reporting formats from facility to facility that made 
facility comparisons difficult. They also cited data errors and 
discrepancies regarding security staff vacancies and prisoner 
disciplinary hearings. On the basis of their review} the FCC 
recommended to the Governor that the CPC be abolished and that the 
contracting and monitoring function should be transferred back to the 
Department of Corrections. 
Oversight in North Carolina 
Managers at the North Carolina Department of Corrections (Doc) 
also assigned full-time contract-compliance monitors to work onsite at 
each of the two CCA prisons. The monitors reported directly to a member 
of the senior executive team at the DOC Division of Prisons responsible 
for management of the CCA contracts. In addition to daily onsite 
monitoring, a team of DOC operational specialists was appointed and 
charged with conducting an annual internal audit of all aspects of 
private prison operations. 
38 The provision of law that exempts CPC facilities from DOC rules 
and policies is viewed as allowing a "double standard" by some state 
officials. 
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A detailed set of ethical standards was established for private , 
prison monitoring staff to govern issues like conflict of interest; 
maintenance of professional relations with private prison staff, 
inmates, their families and assocfates; and handling of confidential 
information. 
The monitors tracked compliance with contract requirements and 
applicable DOC policies and procedures on a 'iCompliance/Concern Tracking 
Log." Each issue was summarized and dated, with documentation of prompt 
notification of private prison staff. 
summary narrative and date was entered. 
When an issue was resolved, a 
When no resolution was obtained 
within a mutually-agreed time frame, monitors filed a corrective action 
plan with identified requirements for resolution. when no resolution 
was reached, the monitors made formal recommendations to the Doc's 
senior management team for addressing the failure with formal sanctions. 
After embarking on privatization of state prison facilities, one 
I 
of the case study states also garnered extensive experience with the 
business of private prisons through involvement with facilities that had 
been built lion speculation." Once built, contracts for housing prisoners 
would be forthcoming from government agencies. These 'spec" prisons 
have had a history containing incidents of prison homicides, escapes, 
riot:;, political corruption, and other ethical issues. 
"SPEC" PRISONS 
I 
Texas was once the world capitol of rrspecrl prisons. Over the 
decade after the Institutional Division established the first four TDCJ 
contracts in 1987, the business of prison privatization exploded in 
Texas. A compensation agreement forged in 1991 between the state and 
local. jails being used to house thousands of "state-readyil prisohers 
awaiting transfer to TDCJ facilities turned the state prisoner backlog 
into a local economic development opportunity. Some counties expanded 
their jails beyond local needs to create space that could be leased out. 
Other counties issued bonds to build new jails specifically for private 
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operation. Eight private jail facilities were financed across the state 
in 1991 through such bonds. 
I 
While local jail authorities were seeking contracts with TDCJ to 
house transfer prisoners , the pri&te jail developers were also 
beginning to exploit more lucrative opportunities to import prisoners 
from overcrowded prison systems outside the state. 
population of state prisoners warehoused in local facilities peaked at 
30,000 but a massive TDCJ prison expansion plan was beginning to produce 
a new prison beds at the state level. Local officials began to feel a 
By 1994 the backlog 
financial pinch. Many counties had become dependent on the large state 
funding stream ($260 million in 1993) that housing state-ready prisoners 
were providing (Ward November 17, 1994). If the local beds remained 
empty, massive layoffs of jail staff would be required. Thus, Texas 
counties were soon scrambling to secure contracts to house out-of-state 
prisoners. 
I 
By 1996 there were 38 private prisons either operating or soon to 
open in the state, including 21 facilities contracted with TDCJ to 
operate as state prisons, parole facilities, or "state jails." Qthers 
were operating under contracts with federal agencies. But some were 
operating completely free of oversight from either Texas or federal 
correctional officials. And by 1997, local private facilities were 
housing nearly 5,500 prisoners from othefa: states. 
The operational problems associated with private laspec" prisons 
became evident when a series of events began to draw attention from the 
media. In 1996, two sex offenders from Oregon were apprehended 200 
miles from Houston 11 days after they escaped from CCA's 411-bed Houston 
Processing Center. State and local authorities had been told by CCA 
that the facility was being used by the INS to hold immigrants facing 
deportation. Criminal offenders were also being confined in the 
facility and the Oregon Department of Corrections had leased 240 beds 
from CCA to house sex offenders. After the arrest of the escapees, the 
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local prosecutor determined that the inmates could not be prosecuted for 
escape because CCA had no statutory authority to detain them. 
When asked by Houston reporters, a CCA spokesperson insisted that 
the company was under no obligation to notify state or local authorities 
about what prisoners were held at the facility. "We designed and built 
the institution. It's oursr1 (Walt August 30, 1996). Concern about the 
problems in rlspecll prisons further escalated after a riot involving 400 
detainees at CCA's Eden Detention Centelr. In response, the Texas 
legislature enacted new laws pertaining to operation of IIspecIl prisons 
and the practice of importing prisoners from other states. The new 
provisions made it a crime to escape from a private prison. 
addition, private prison operators were required to have some 
In 
contractual relationship with local authorities and private guards would 
have to be licensed by the state. 
Despite these reforms, the difficulties in nspecll prisons 
persisted. There were problems of escapes and disturbances, and 
complaints (by both prisoners and by out-of-state contracting agencies) 
about inadequate food service and medical care, poor security and 
classification procedures, and inexperienced, inadequately trained 
staff. Public concerns were raised again when it came to light in the 
media that the deputy director at the Commission on Jail Standards (an 
agency given charge of monitoring the private facilities) was being paid 
$42,000 a year in addition to his state salary to moonlight as a 
consultant for one of the private prison companies whose facilities he 
oversaw (Walt November 12, 1997). 
Caught in an intense media spotlight, Texas backed away from its 
I 
role as the leading "host state" for prisoners imported from other 
states' prison systems. By January 2001 there were no longer any 
prisoners housed in private facilities in Texas under contracts from 
other states. 
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PRIVATE PRISON OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS 
Most of the operational difficulties encountered with private 
prison contracting in the case study states have occurred during the 
early years of facility operations. 
activation of new prisons are also familiar in the public sector but 
these difficulties are exacerbated within in the private prison industry 
due largely to structural personnel issues. 
/ I  
The problems associated with 
When public prisons are activated,, corrections managers are able 
to build a staffing plan on a platform of experienced personnel. A 
sizable group of experienced correctional officers are typically 
transferred from other facilities within the state, under leadership of 
a qualified, seasoned management team. Even the largest private prison 
companies cannot afford this flexibility. The industry leaders are 
national companies (two are transnational). Transfer of large numbers 
of staff to new facilities built in isolated rural areas is not a 
financially attractive proposition. Moreover, the industry is still 
quite new, with most private facilities operating for less than a 
decade. Given that turnover among the staff is generally three times 
I 
higher than that for the public corrections field, those who maintain 
private prison employment may be promoted at a level of experience below 
that required in the public corrections system. 
The current labor market for correctional workers is extremely 
tight:, making it very difficult for private prison companies to keep 
wages low and continue to fill vacancies. The result has been high 
rates of position vacancies at private facilities. Supervising a 
relatively inexperienced staff that is working long hours of mandatory 
overtime in order to keep the security posts covered, many private 
prisons managers are finding themselves contending with high levels of 
staff burn-out and exhaustion. 
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Problems in Texas 
Within a year of activation of the first four private prisons 
under contract with the Institutions Division, state officials found 
I that the private operators were failing to provide the level of 
education programs and medical care required under the contracts. In May 
1990, a TDCJ audit gave low marks to both CCA and Wackenhut. Wackenhut 
was cited for inadequate school programs, low enrollment for substance 
abuse treatment, and deficient delivery of medical and dental care. CCA 
had instituted just one of seven vocational training courses required by 
state contracts and was deficient in provision of medical care. .Both 
companies were cited for use of excessive force by staff (Ward May 16, 
1990). 
For the past few years, private pri.son operations under TDCJ 
Institutions Division contracts have seemed relatively uneventful. 
private operations of State Jail facilities in Texas have been far from 
problem free, however. At the Travis County State Jail, staffing issues 
were the main problem. Job turnover was extremely high and 
under-staffing soon became a chronic problem. TDCJ audits documented 
that Wackenhut was failing to fill vacant positions and staff in 
accordance with the approved staffing plan. Auditors found that 
staffing records had been falsified. Shift rosters did not agree with 
payroll timesheets. Programs were not fully staffed and many teachers 
were uncertified. Vocational classes had not been implemented. There 
was a shortage of uniforms, underwear, shoes, blankets, and towels. 
TDCJ officials responsible for managing the state jail system held back 
$625,000 in payments to Wackenhut over two years in connection with 
unfilled staff positions (Quin September 1, 1999; Ward and Quin 
September 2 ,  1999). The take-over by the State Jail Division occurred 
at the beginning of November. TDCJ officials found that Wackenhut had 
not been performing necessary maintenance to the TDCJ-owned facility 
plant. 
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Problems have recently developed in a second privately-operated 
State Jail located north of Austin. 
escaped from CCA's Bartlett State Jail. 
closed-circuit surveillance monitors were not being watched when the two 
made their way out of the prison and the perimeter fence alarm was 
ignored (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, State Jail Division 
September 7 ,  2000). 
In late August 2000, two prisoners 
TDCJ investigators found that 
Problems in Florida 
If there are serious operational problems in CPC contracted 
facilities, they have not risen to a level sufficient magnitude to draw 
sustained media attention of the sbrt found in many other states. 
Because the private prisons in Florida are air conditioned and allow 
amenities (such as television) not present in Florida's public prisons, 
most prisoners would probably prefer them to the public prisons. 
Moreover, according to DOC officials, violent behavior,is likely to 
resu:Lt in a prisoner's transfer back to the public system. These 
factors, coupled with the fact that many private prisoners may be 
nearing their release date, create a strong incentive for good behavior 
at the private prisons. 
Start-up problems at CCAIs Lake City Correctional Facility 
included high turnover and extended vacancies in counselor and 
instructor positions. The facility has been under the management of at 
least. three warden since its opening. One facility did not receive a 
license to operate its drug treatment program for 10 months after they 
began providing these services. 
special education services were not met until intervention by the State 
Department of Education. 
action plan was developed and implemented over a period of 18 months. 
State ahd federal regulations regarding 
With the assistance from the DOC, a corrective 
News reports have recounted at least two escapes from Wackenhutls 
South Bay facility (Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government 
Accountability March, 2000). 
i 
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Problems in North Carolina 
, 
North Carolina's private prisons were activated after the wide 
p~lb].icity surrounding the many types of problems that have plagued 
private facilities, including some of those that had been used to house 
the state's overflow prisoners. Anticipating that operational problems 
might arise, DOC managers negotiated separate contracts for each 
facility. 
state. The second contract covered prison operations. Echoing the 
Texas approach, contract specifications for these facilities required 
the private contractor to manage operations strictly in line with the 
Doc's policies for publicly operated prisons. 
Under one contract, the prison facility was leased by the 
I 
, 
The contracts specified that all private prison security staff 
would be required to possess the same qualifications as are required for 
employment at DOC prisons. Starting salary levels were roughly 
comparable but benefits were more limited at CCA compared to the DOC. 
The same basic educational programs and medical services were to be 
provided at the private prisons as at medium-security state facilities. 
In addition, each private prison was to incorporate a 63-bed 
fltherapeutic community" drug treatment program and each was supposed to 
provide 100 llmarket-wage'l jobs for prisoners by recruiting private 
businesses to set up industry shops within the prisons. 
From the start, there were issues of compliance with contract 
requirements at both facilities. High levels of turnover were 
particularly problematic at the supervisory level because it was 
resulted in the promotion of relatively unseasoned, inexperienced staff. 
One marked difference in personnel practices between CCA and the public 
prison system pertained to promotion of security staff. While state 
prison correctional officers are required by civil service rules to gain 
many years of seniority and experience before they can qualify for 
promotion, some staff at CCA's prisons were reported to receive much 
more rapid promotions. Apparently CCA personnel were eligible to 
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advance to a management position comparable to a DOC captain within a 
matter of months, rather than years. 
Prison work assignments were also not meeting contractual levels. 
The monitor assigned at one facility observed that many prisoners 
receiving a work assignment were not constructively engaged in full-time 
work. The lack of adequate work assignments produced more than just the 
problem of idle time. Under North Carolina laws, prisoners' "gain time" 
is dependent on their having an assignment. 
Another frequent issue raised was non-compliance with the DOC 
inmate grievance process. Grievance complaints were being filed at 
roughly double the normal rate at DOC facilities. Audit results showed 
that many CCA personnel practices were found to be non-compliant with 
DOC policies. The facility's employment roster was out of date, showing 
a number of staff that were no longer employed at the facility, while 
omitting the names of others who were employed. Employees filling 
senior positions did not appear to meet the standards for education, 
experience, or training required of their counterparts at the DOC. 
Counselors had received just half of the required hours of training. 
Many personnel files lacked the records required to verify educational 
credentials, or documentation that they had met requirements for 
background checks, medical examinations, or urinalysis. 
CCA was found to be non-compliant in a variety of fiscal 
administrative matters, such as lacking proper procedures for the 
handling of negotiable instruments, lacking an adequate inventory 
control process, and failing to provide monthly financial reports to the 
DOC. Canteen records were inaccurate at one facility. Prisoner medical 
records were not being properly maintained at another facility, and a 
variety of discrepancies were found in the handling of drugs in the 
prison pharmacy. There were few controls over processing of receipts or 
payment of invoices at the facility. 
control. At the same facility, education programs were found to be 
severely deficient. 
There was no internal inventory 
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Problems with staffing and services continued to plague I the CCA 
operations and DOC managers worried that more severe difficulties might 
lie ahead if CCA did not bring both facilities into compliance. 
managers were holding back payments to CCA due to unfilled positions. 
Each. vacancy in the Education Department was costing CCA an amount equal 
to the entry-level salary paid teachers at the local community college. 
DOC 
Responding to the job shortfalls at botli CCA prisons, DOC managers began 
withholding an amount equal to the speciified daily 'Iroom and board" 
1 
deduction from per diem payments to CCA for each industry job that was 
not provided. 
in payments because of chronic staff vacancies and the failure to 
provide most of the contracted industry jobs for employment of 
prisoners. 
I 
By June 2000, managers at: the DOC had withheld $1. million 
CCA's managers seemed to be unable to satisfy the contractual 
obligations. 
the problem, warning that unless some financial adjustments could be 
made to provide CCA with more leeway, the company might not be able 
continue operations on such an unprofitable basis. 
to negotiate an amicable termination of the two private prison 
They approached the executive staff at Fhe DOC to discuss , 
DOC managers decided 
management contracts with CCA. 
announced it would terminate CCAIs five-year management contracts. DOC 
After less than two years, the DOC 
managers moved to assume all aspects of operations while continuing to 
lease the prison facilities from CCA. On October 12000, the state 
assumed management of both facilities. 
ASSESSMENT OF CORRECTIONAL COSTS AND PERFORMANCE 
The burgeoning expense of prison expansion in the U.S. appeared to 
drive privatization of correctional services forward for a decade and 
half of fast growth. While the debate on the matter of cost savings has 
been vigorous, the body of rigorous, credible research on performance 
quality is extremely limited. And to date, credible evidence of 
significant savings is scant. \ 
i I' 
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Texas has yet to produce an "apples to apples" comparison of 
private and public prison costs, relying instead on comparisons of 
private prisons with "hypothetical" or "prototype" public institutions. 
I 
In North Carolina, a planned research project to examine the costs and 
performance of private prisons was abandoned when the state took over 
their operations. 
substantial effort has been undertaken to examine these issues in 
Of the three case study states, only in Florida has a 
sufficient detail to produce findings on which policymakers can rely. 
Costs in North Carolina , 
I 
While the per diem fees paid to CCA totaled about $50,39 state 
officials were aware that comparing these figures with the average daily 
cost of $67 at state-operated facilities gave a deceptive impression of 
cost savings. Medical costs were capped under CCA's contract, and DOC 
managers made sure that only healthy, tractable prisoners were sent to 
the private prisons. Other hidden costs (e.g., transportation, 
monitoring, central administration) boost the actual expenditures for 
, 
privatization (Rawlins November 17, 1999). 
Plans for a comparison study of cost and quality conducted by 
researchers at North Carolina State University were set aside when it 
was determined that the management contracts would be terminated. 
Consequently, adequate data to compare either the quality or the true 
costs of CCA's operations with public prisons in North Carolina is not 
available. 
Cost Issues in Texas 
There are many elements of private prisons management in Texas 
that result in a private prisoner population that should be both easier 
39 The state paid separate fees for operation of prison services 
and for lease of the facilities. At one facility, the per diem for 
services was $36.14, while the annual lease fee of $2,865,600 adds an 
extra $14.87 per prisoner per day; at another the per diem was $35.94, 
and the lease fee ($2,757,522) adds $14.31. 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
- 101 - 
and cheaper to manage than the general population in public prisons. 
While the Texas legislature specified that both medium and minimum 
custody prisoners could be housed in private prisons, TDCJ officials 
have restricted use of these prisons for minimum custody prisons only. 
private prisons under contract with TDCJ do not operate close custody or 
administrative segregation units. If prisoners are charged with serious 
misconduct, they are transferred to pub:Lic prisons. Private prison 
facilities also lack the capacity to provide Ifin-patient" medical or 
psychiatric care, SO prisoners who develop a need for such services are 
also transferred to public prisons. 
transferred to private prisons, but if they do note require 
Prisoners with HIV may be 
hospitalization. 
According to information available from various state agencies 
that track correctional costs in Texas, the average per diem costs at 
private prisons have actually declined slightly since the early days of 
contracting. The negotiations were conducted within a framework that 
set a contract limit of $38.28 for 1989-"-a figure that was 10 percent 
less than the cost estimate ($42.53) determined by the Legislative 
Budget Board for operation of fthypotheticallt s ate-run units of the type 
to be contracted. The per diem costs for the first four contract 
facilities were negotiated at $34.79 for the biennium ending August 31 
1989 and $35.25 for the biennium ending August 31 1991 (Sunset Advisory 
Commission 1991). 
Although per diem costs have not risen, it is by no means clear 
how much savings--if any--is being realized through private operation of 
prisons in Texas. The Texas Sunset Advisory Commission (SAC) was 
initially charged by the legislature with determining if the first four 
private prisons to be contracted were meeting a ten-percent cost-savings 
benchmark. The SAC had been created by the legislature in 1977 to 
identify and eliminate waste, duplication, and inefficiency in 
government agencies. In 1991 analysts at the SAC reported that Texas' 
private prisons were operating at close' to the 10 percent benchmark, and 
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that after accounting for Itmoney paid in lieu of tax revenues,Il the cost 
savings reached 14 percent (SAC 1991) . 4 0  
The SAC study was not an "apples to apples" comparison, however. 
Since the TDCJ operated no compafable public prisons, they constructed a 
hypothetical model prison for comparing costs, the same methods that had 
been used initially to determine the cost benchmark for contracting 
purposes. 
quality of services, without actual public prisons at hand, the SAC 
anal.ysts were unable to meet this mandate (Texas Comptroller of Public 
AcCC)UntS 1991). 
Although their legislative directive included comparing the 
While security costs may be less in the private prisons in part 
because of a more compact, efficient facility design, they are also 
likely to be lower due to the nature of the confinement population. 
Minimum-security prisoners at the pre-release stage may not require the 
same level of security staffing as the general prison population 
confined in public facilities. Moreover, the cost estimate for private 
prisons did not include all of the types of costs absorbed by TDCJ 
(Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 1993). 
I 
The most recent cost estimates avfiilable from the Criminal Justice 
Policy Council indicate that privately contracted State Jail facilities 
were operating at a per diem cost of $28.64 in fiscal year 2000, 
compared to $32.08 at the public state :jails. A per diem estimate of 
I 
4 0  While the initial plan had been for the facilities to be 
constructed an owned by the vendors, it was later decided that costs 
would be less if the state took over this function. Because the state 
owns the facilities, property taxes are not assessed. But by contract, 
the vendors pay local governments an annual amount in lieu of the taxes 
that would be owed if they owned the properties. 
from its TDCJ contract for operation of the Cleveland facility after 
failure to resolve a dispute over payments due to the city. In 1995 CCA 
had slashed a $180,000 payment-in-lieu of taxes to $80,000 in order to 
pare costs in the face of stiff competition when its contract was re-bid 
by TDCJ. The Cleveland school district filed a lawsuit that was settled 
in 1998 when CCA agreed to pay the $300,000 arrears, but when the school 
board requested an independent audit of CCA's financial condition, CCA 
pulled out of the state contract. 
management at an increased per diem fee of $5 more than CCA had 
received, and to pay the full amount required (Horswell November 24, 
1998). 
In 1998 CCA withdrew 
Wackenhut agreed to take over 
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$37.25 was reported for private prisons operated under contract with the 
Institutions Division. This figure included housing costs, minor 
medical services, transportation and leases. Costs for TDCJ 
administrative services, monitoring, major medical costs, and diagnostic 
and classification services were not included. The estimate reported 
for a 1000-bed public institution housing general population prisoners 
was $37.34. Average per diem costs for additional capacity contracted 
by the Institutional Division in local county facilities was reported to 
be $39.96 (Criminal Justice Policy Council 2001). 
i 
Cost and Quality Assessment in Florida 
The most comprehensive set of comparison studies of public and 
private prison performance and costs has been undertaken in Florida. 
Section 957.07 of Florida Statutes mandates a savings of at least 7 
percent for private prisons that confine an adult population. 
Determination of whether the private prisons are meeting this 
requirement has proved to be a difficult and contentious enterprise. 
The public and private prisons are not comparable in terms of either 
facility design or level of program services. State legislators have 
charged that private prisons contain costs by llcherry-pickingll healthy 
and well-behaved prisoners (Croft March 15, 1998). 
Addressing the challenge of providing an accurate comparison of 
public and private correctional costs in their state, Office of Program 
Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (OPPAGA) analysts have 
struggled to overcome the lack of fully comparable facilities by making 
their best judgments about how to adjust costs to account for 
differences in the size of institutions, the types of prisoners they 
confine, and the programs they offer. Over a period of six years they 
produced a series of studies that, taken together, chronicle the 
development of prison privatization in Florida and give a wealth of 
detailed information about their operations. 
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In 1998, OPPAGA analysts conducted a comprehensive review of both 
, 
construction and operational costs for two privately run facilities. 
They concluded that cost savings goals were not being met, and that only 
one of the private prisons produdkd any cost savings in FY 1996-97 
(OPPAGA 1998). 
TO compare private construction costs with public costs OPPAGA 
selected three public prisons opened in the same year (1995) as the 
private facilities. 
local governments, yet site preparation costs for roads, sewage 
The public prisons were built on land donated by 
treatment, and other infrastructure development exceeded the combined 
site! acquisition and preparation costs for the private prisons. 
Construction costs per bed, however, were comparatively lower for the 
public prisons. 
At least in part, the lower site 'costs for the private prisons 
I were attributed to their more compact design, less accessible location 
of the more spread-out trcampus'l style public facilities. The DOC is 
able to utilize the labor of prisoners for some aspects of construction, 
reducing costs by an estimated 16 percent. The higher per-bed 
construction costs at CCA's Bay Correctional facility reflect a design 
that provides two-person cells for all prisoners, while Wackenhut's 
design included dormitory housing for many prisoners. 
prisons also rely largely on dormitory housing and so CcA's Bay 
Florida's public 
I Correctional Facility proved to be the most expensive of all to 
construct, costing 1 percent more per bed than the most expensive public 
prison in the comparison. 
OPPAGA analysts determined that neither prison was meeting the 
statutory requirement of 7 percent savings. CCA's operations at Bay 
Correctional Facility had produced no cost savings at all, while 
Wackenhut operated its Moore Haven Correctional Facility at a savings of 
4 percent. 
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Comparing the quality of correctional services, analysts at OPPAGA 
I 
concluded that correctional service performance at the private prisons 
was roughly consistent with performance reported by the public prisons. 
The two private facilities reported lower rates of assaults and 
disciplinary incidents, while reporting higher levels of attainment of 
GED certificates and completions for education and treatment programs. 
But the analysts noted that the profile of the prisoners seLected for 
transfer to private prisons might account for these differences. 
Reviewing contract requirements for education and treatment services at 
the private prisons, the analysts, observed that after 'both vendors 
encountered difficulties fulfilling program participation obligations, 
the CPC managers sought amended contracts to reduce these requirements 
by more than half: from 765  prisoners to 325 at the CCA facility, and 
from 1519 to 606 at Wackenhut. Contract payments to the vendors were 
not reduced, however (Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government 
Accountability 1998). 
In 1999 OPPAGA undertook a review of the newest contract facility, 
a prison for youthful offenders operated by CCA. OPPAGA analysts noted 
that this facility does not provide a greater'variety or number of 
programs than the four other youthful offender institutions run by the 
DOC (Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability 
2000). Comparing the education programs at the private facility with 
those at the DOC-run prisons, the analysts determined that by the middle 
of 1999 enrollment levels at the private prison were favorable, 
especially for vocational training programs. Youthful offenders in the 
private facility earned GED certificates at a higher rate, compared with 
juveniles in public facilities. A review of operational costs indicated 
that while costs at the larger state youthful offender facilities were 
lower due to economies of scale, the per diem costs €or the private 
institution fell within the range of comparably-sized public facilities. 
Finally, OPPAGA analysts compared Wackenhut's close-custody 
prison, South Bay, with the state-operated Okeechobee. After adjusting 
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I !  
I I " 
for a variety of different factors to accaunt for important differences 
in how the facilities were operated (e.g., the public prison had fewer 
I 
education and treatment programs and prisoner work crews provide 
community services outside the prison clompound), it was determined that 
a 6 percent cost savings had been achieved by the private prison in FY 
1998-99, nearly meeting the statutory cost-savings benchmark of 7 
, 
percent. 
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IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The current project used a multi-level analysis to answer key 
I 
questions related to the impact of VOI/TIS on prison management and 
privatization experiences. 
decade, case studies of prison management and privatization were 
Analyses of national data for the past 
conducted to answer the following questions: 
0 What management changes have been made by state correctional 
agencies in order to deal with the increase in the numbers of 
violent offenders being incarcerated, many for much longer 
periods than in the past? 
0 What additional safety and training procedures have been 
instituted for correctional staff in order to deal with the 
increase in violent offenders? 
0 How does the increase in violent offenders affect the type and 
extent of programming (e.g., education, prison employment) 
health care and safety procedures? 
0 What types of offenders, programs, or services fall within 
private corrections? What has been the experience 
corrections in terms of inmate and officer safety, 
accountability and costs? 
of private 
infractions, 
LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
As we noted in our national evaluation of the implementation and 
early outcomes of VOI/TIS on crime rates, prison sentences, admissions, 
and time served (see Turner et al. 2001:l~, the current evaluation also 
operated under several constraints. First, the current evaluation was 
conducted relatively early in the implementation of VOI/TIS. The 
impacts of TIS legislation will not be felt until violent offenders 
begin to serve the portions of their sentences that are beyond that 
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which was historically served. Second, although we can examine the 
differential effects of states that did and did not receive TIS funding, 
we cannot determine the impact of VOI/TIS funds overall. This is 
because all states received funding from the program. We do not have a 
set of states, for comparison purposes, that did not participate in the 
VOI/TIS program. 
First, our evaluation was conducted early in the implementation of 
VOI/TIS; the full impact of VOI/TIS will not be seen until years from 
now. States do not have to spend VOI/TIS funds during the year in which 
they are received--they have up to four years from the year in which 
they are awarded. Thus states have not yet built all the beds 
originally envisioned for VOI/TIS offenders. In addition, the impact of 
TIS legislation will not be felt until violent offenders begin to seme 
the portions of their sentences that are beyond that which was 
historically served. Second, although we can examine the differential 
effects of states that did and did not receive TIS funding, we cannot 
determine the impact of VOI/TIS funds overall. This is because all 
states received funding from the program. We do not have a set of 
states, for comparison purposes, that did not participate in the VOI/TIS 
program. Thus, changes we observe over time may be due to other events, 
sentencing changes, or national trends not associated with VOI/TIS. 
I 
In fact, this was often mentioned in our interviews for the.prison 
management case studies--states are experiences many changes in 
legislation that increase penalties--not just TIS legislation. 
NATIONAL ANALYSES OF PRISON MANAGE- TRENDS 
We conducted analyses over time for states who received TIS 
funding vs. those that did not, and for states with structured 
sentencing--determinate sentencing or voluntary or presumptive 
guidelines--versus indeterminate sentencing states, in order to identify 
patterns that might differ among states with different sentencing 
policies. 
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Overall, our national analyses suggest one of two patterns. 
I 
Changes have been occurring in some measures over the past decade, but 
some measures have remained fairly constant. We do not observe sharp 
changes for TIS states about the time of many states were passing TIS 
legislation in 1994. In some instances, TIS states show higher levels 
of prison management concerns (such as percent of inmates at high/close 
custody, misconduct reports), but for other variables, non-TIS states 
show higher levels (such as inmate assaults). We'did not find strong 
evidence for our hypotheses regarding the potential impact of TIS on 
prison management variables. 
Averaging over states in these analyses may mask important state level 
experiences. In addition, data are available only during the first 
several years after TIS legislation was passed in many states. As we 
This may be due to several reasons. 
found in our national VOI/TIS evaluation, we may need to wait several 
more years in order to gauge 
PRISON MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY 
Based on our case study 
the impact of such sentencing policies. 
INTERVIEWS 
interviews, it appears the VOI/TIS and 
other get tough policies have had at least some impact on prison 
management within individual states. Most of our interviewees reported 
longer sentences, greater numbers of older inmates, and increased 
crowding. These conditions were not unanimously considered a direct 
result of VOI/TIS, but were often considered the result of a rising 
prison population-to which VOI/TIS has contributed. One consistent 
theme was the anticipation that VOI/TIS and other get tough policies 
would have an impact on prison management in the future. TIS and other 
changes in sentencing policy are relatively new and most of our 
respondents expect greater impact, in terms of crowding, aging inmates, 
and costs, will be observed as more inmates are sentenced under the new 
policies. 
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PRIVATIZATION CASE STUDIES 
The privatization case studies were designed to examine and 
document management practices in state correctional systems with more 
than a few years of experience with prison privatization, and to explore 
whether the provisions of VOI/TIS, or other elements of the movement 
promoting "get toughrt legislation have affected how states approach the 
issu,e of privatization. 
/ I  
For more than fifteen years private prison marketing efforts have 
been built on assertions that they could deliver higher quality services 
at a lower price than public correctional agencies. The public debates 
about whether a state should include prison privatization among the 
approaches taken to improve or expand the correctional system are 
usually couched in terms of correctional costs and efficiency, but the 
evidence to date does not offer solid support for the claims made by 
proponents. There are other factors, however, that underlie and 
influence the decision process. 
The decision to privatize prison operations is ultimately made in 
the political arena, by legislators and governors, not by a state's 
professional correctional managers. Over the course of the fifteen-year 
history of this industry, all states have faced huge increases in their 
prison populations but fewer than half have chosen to address this 
problem by contracting with private companies to build or manage state 
prisons within their political boundaries.41 Regional political 
traditions and the political cultures appear to play a predominant 
in determining whether a state will move to privatize its prisons. 
example, almost all of the early contracts were let for facilities 
and operated in traditionally conservative "right-to-work" states, 
role 
For 
built 
where 
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,correctional labor unions are weak or non-existent and strong 
bi-partisan support for private prisons prevails. Specific VOI/TIS or 
"get; tough" measures that have been incorporated in a state's criminal 
justice policies and practices do not appear to play a major role. 
/ I  
Our case studies show that private management of prisons is often 
associated with specific patterns of shortcomings and deficiencies 
(e.g., higher rates of staff turnover, problems with classification and 
inmate discipline, deficient provision of basic services, higher rates 
of violent assaults). Many of these problems can be traced to the 
primary objective of the industry: to reap profits from the high-risk 
business of operating prisons. But once the political decision to 
privatize is made, a state's correctional managers face a number of 
administrative challenges, as we discuss below. 
Considerations for Private Prisons 
Given the strong financial incentives to cut costs in order 
maximize profits while remaining llcompetitive," performance from private 
prison contractors becomes a key issue. 
proper role of public correctional management in these transactions 
should be to set high performance standards and outcome measures, and 
then to stand back and let the private sector "innovate" its way toward 
more efficient ways to do business. As has been pointed out by Austin, 
a review of the current state of private correctional practice reveals 
scant evidence of innovation (Austin and Coventry 1999). Private 
companies have often hired veteran managers from the public corrections 
Some have argued that the 
I 
systems. In Minnesota, private companies mimicked the public system in 
- 
41 Many states, e.g. , New York and Illinois, have no involvement 
with prison privatization, though they may contract with for-profit 
vendors of community corrections, halfway houses and the like, Some 
states such as Hawaii and Wisconsin, have sent prisoners to be confined 
in private prisons located elsewhere, but have not yet embraced the 
concept of privately-operated prisons within their borders. 
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some ways, while failing to provide required service delivery in a 
number of areas (Greene 2000). 
Given this experience, public managers should provide precisely 
detailed prescriptions for every aspect of prison operations as they 
issue requests for proposals and negotiate contracts. A review of the 
experience with prison privatization in the three case-study states i 
suggests that such administrative practices are essential to managing 
the risks and help to secure adequate levels of performance from private 
prison vendors : 
0 Clear and detailed specifications for every aspect of prison 
operations need to be incorporated in "requests for proposalst8 
for private prison operation to establish comprehensive 
performance expectations and set an unambiguous. framework for 
contracting, and for management oversight, monitoring, and 
enforcement of contract requirements. Contracts must 
incorporate a detailed, enforceable staffing plan, and should 
specify quantified performance measures for delivery of 
security services, healthcare, and correctional programs. 
0 Strict monitoring and enforcement are needed to enforce the 
terms of the contract. 
by a dedicated full-time experienced corrections professional; 
careful documentation of operational deficiencies and problems; 
and enforcement sanctions with specific monetary sanctions 
(e.g., per diem adjustments) that will be triggered when 
explicit performance benchmarks are not met. 
This requires daily onsite monitoring 
A decade and a half of experience with privatization in the U.S. 
evokes a number of other cautions for approaching correctional 
privatization : 
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A jurisdiction should not privatize so large a proportion of 
institutional corrections that the system becomes dependent on 
private management and cannot :bargain to its best advantage--or 
finds itself unable to take over prison operations (or absorb 
the contracted population load) if things go wrong. The 
proportion of privatized prison operations in a jurisdiction 
should therefore remain quite :low. The private prison beds 
contracted by TDCJ comprise just 12 percent of the total TDCJ 
bed capacity.42 While a state system as large as Texas may be 
able to handle a risk of that magnitude, a smaller state might 
find it hard to manage the risks of privatizing that large a 
share of their system. For the same reasons, jurisdictions 
that chose to privatize prison operations should maintain 
/ I  
ownership of the facilities involved. This will help to avoid 
impediments to converting private prisons to public management 
if the costs of privatization (financial or political) prove to 
be too high. 
Jurisdictions should have clear and realistic objectives and 
expectations. The consensus among credible researchers is that 
the public cannot expect to obtain much--if any--tax-dollar 
savings through privatization. 
services and prison programs id essential. Vendors who propose 
Adequate funding for security 
I per diems that appear (at least on paper) to produce 
substantial savings may be bidding deliberately and 
irresponsibly low. Politicians who make expansive claims of 
savings through privatization 
inevitable hidden costs, such 
improper treatment in private 
are probably ignoring the 
as increased complaints of 
facilities. 
42 The total number of private prison beds is 19,245, but that 
figure is for "secure facilities," and does not include halfway-house 
community-based drug treatment beds. 
or 
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, Jurisdictions should not contract for prison beds outside of 
their political boundaries, nor- should they allow sspecll 
prisons to be built or operated within them. 
amassed by private prison operators that contract for 
The track record 
/ I  
out-of-state prisoners is especially poor. The logistics of 
monitoring and enforcing contracts for beds located hundreds or 
thousands of miles away are difficult. The lack of adequate 
local and state jurisdictional control over "spec" prisons has 
given rise to a set of operational, legal, and political 
problems that have not been sufficiently addressed by any host 
jurisdiction to date. 
Private prison contractors should be required to pay prevailing 
wages and provide comparable benefit levels for private prison 
staff. At the time of our study, the strains placed by a 
strong economy on the correctional labor pool were affecting 
public prison systems adversely--especially in states like 
Texas, where the prison system expanded at a rate that has 
stripped a labor market that was already extremely tight. 
Private prison operators that of fer lower compensation for line 
staff than is afforded them by public correctional agencies 
{whether to effect savings or to increase profits) found it 
increasingly difficult to fill staff vacancies and cover key 
security posts. In many private prisons the result has been a 
security force that is under-qualified, insufficiently 
experienced, and exhausted though excessive, involuntary 
overtime. 
Given the patterns of structural deficiencies mentioned above, 
the best results with private prison operations are achieved by 
limiting contractors to provision of housing and services €or 
the least challenging prisoners. This means restricting the 
private market to relatively low-security prisoners who are not 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.
This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view
expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
- 115 - 
prone to violence, and who are nearing the end of their prison 
sentences and therefore have every incentive for good behavior. 
The track record is not encouraging where public managers have 
not taken great care in selection of candidates for transfer to 
private prisons, or where vendors have been willing to accept 
prisoners beyond their management capacity. This has been 
especially true in instances where prisoner classification 
tools were defective or overridden by conkingent circumstances, 
or where prisoners in need of expensive, individualized 
services (juvenile offenders, mentally ill prisoners) were 
transferred to private facilities that were not equipped to 
address their needs. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, our analyses suggest that VOI/TIS may not be having a 
major impact to date on prison management issues and privatization. 
I 
Longer term historical trends have been impacting prison management over 
the past decade. 
VOI/TIS and may be related more to political than to administrative 
correctional decisions. 
The use of privatization has been very modest under 
Although our analyses did not reveal large impacts on prison 
management at the national level, it is possible to provide more precise 
information on several prison management topics at the individual state 
levell. For example, by examining differences in inmate participation in 
programming, inmate grievances, and assaults in states where portions of 
similar inmates are sentenced under TIS and non-TIS laws, we may be able 
to observe a clearer impact of such policies. Such analyses have been 
conducted in North Carolina (Memory et al. 1999) and currently being 
investigated by RAND using data from Washington State. 
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I 
PRISON MANAGEMENT 
1. Loncr Sentences. Is your state experiencing an increase in the 
number of inmates who are required to serve long sentences with 
restrictions on early release? If so, what do you think is the cause of 
this increase in long-term inmates? Are there any particular 
characteristics these inmates share, such as youth, violent convictions, 
I or dxug convictions? 
2. Special Pomlations. Has there been an increase in inmates 
with special needs, such as physical or mental health care, or drug 
treatment? Has your state experienced or is it anticipating an increase 
in older inmates? If so, are any preparations or plans being made for 
the medical care, housing, and/or management of this gnoup of inmates? 
3 .  Inmate Classification. Does it. seem that Truth in Sentencing 
. (TIS) or other "get toughtf sentencing policies have impacted inmate 
classification, such as how it is conducted, factors considered in 
determining classification, number of classification hearings, or amount 
of paperwork involved in the process? 
share of inmates at each classification level, such as more inmates 
Was there been a change in the 
classified at higher custody levels? 
4. Costs. Has there been an increase in the cost of 
incarceration due to TIS or other "get tough" sentencing policies? If 
so, in what categories have costs have increased (for example, total 
dollars, health care, segregation, administration, and programming)? 
What do you think is the cause of this increase in costs? 
5. Crowdinq. Have prisons in your state become more crowded in 
recent years? If SO, how much of this do you think is related to TIS or 
other "get tough" policies? How do these policies make prisons more 
crowded (for example, limiting early release, sentencing more inmates to 
prison, sentencing inmates to longer terms)? Has it become necessary 
(or has consideration been given) to grdnting early release to some 
inmates to make room for long-term or higher risk inmates? 
i 
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6. Safetv. Has there been a change in the safety of prisons, , 
such as an increase in inmate-on-inmate or inmate-on-'staff assaults? 
I 
Have there been increases in infradtions or other disciplinary actions 
taken against inmates for disruptive behavior? If the level of safety 
has changed, have much of this seems to be related to TIS or other "get 
toughtl policies? Have additional safety and training procedures or 
policies regarding the use of force been considered or implemented? 
so, what do you think brought about these changes?' 
, / 
4 ,  
If 
7. Grievances. Has there been an increase in inmate grievances 
or lawsuits? 
of grievance or law suit, such as issues related to crowding, 
classification, programming or medical services? To what extent does it 
If so, has there been an increase in any, particular types 
seem that TIS and other "get tough1' policies are responsible for this? 
8. Staff ResDonse. Have staff workloads or schedules changed as 
a result of TIS or other Itget tough" policies? Have changes in the 
1 ,  
composition of the prison population affected staff morale, stress 
levels, absenteeism, and attitudes? Has staff turnover, disability 
claims, or retirement levels changed? Have correctional officers' 
associations or unions sought to make any changes, such as increased 
safety training or staffing levels? 
9. Health Care. What are the major health concerns among your 
state's prison population? Do you think TIS or other Itget tough" 
policies have influenced these concerns (for example the availability of 
or access to care or treatment for assault injuries)? What are your 
state's policies for testing inmates for TB and HIV? Has there been an 
increase in the share of inmates infected with TB or HIV? 
10. Inmate Proqramming. Does it seem that changes in sentencing 
policy or changes in prison populations (if any) have affected the type 
or availability of programming, such as work, education, and treatment 
opportunities? 
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PRIVATIZATION 
1. Number of Private Facilities. How many private facilities 
operate in your state and who operates them? Were any of them aspecll 
facilities? How many inmates are'housed in these facilities? Do these 
populations include inmates from different jurisdictions? Do you think 
that, private facilities have been used 'to accommodate changes in the 
prison population resulting from TIS or other "get toughEg sentencing 
policies? 
2. Inmate Characteristics and Prosrammins. What process is used 
to a.ssign inmates to private or public facilities? What types of 
programs and services are available in ]private facilities? How do these 
programs and services compare to those of public facilities? 
3. Out of State Private Placements. Are inmates being held at 
out-of-state private facilities? How are these facilities selected? 
Have out-of-state facilities been utilized in the past? 
selected? What was the experience with this type of contracting? 
How were they 
4. Staff Oualifications. How do the staff working in private 
facilities compare to staff at public facilities in terms of training, 
experience, salary and benefits, turnover, and morale? 
5. Phvsical Plant. How do the physical accommodations, medical 
services, amenities, and inmate activities compare between public and 
private facilities? 
6. Securitv. How do security and safety levels compare between 
public and private facilities? 
7. Costs. How do the costs compare between public and private 
facilities? If they are different, how are they different and why do 
you think that is so? 
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B. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION (ACA) SURVEY OF DEPARTMENTS OF 
CORRECTIONS I , 
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RAND / AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION EVALUATION 
OF VIOLENT OFFENDER INCARCERATION AND TRUTH IN SENTENCING GRANTS 
RAND, a non-profit research organization in Santa Monica, California, is conducting an evaluation for the 
National Institute of Justice on the Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth in Sentencing (VOI/TIS) grants 
awarded as part the 1994 Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. The grants provide funds 
to state and local correctional systems to expand their capacity to incarcerate violent offenders with more 
certainty, and to impose longer and more determinate sentences. As a means of determining how individual 
states respond, RAND is tracking legislative, policy, and operational changes ,at the state and local level. 
I 
In collaboration with RAND, the American Correctional Association is surveying state departments of i ,I 
corrections to gather information about implementation and expectations concerning VOVTIS funding, as well 
as the impact of Truth-in-Sentencing laws, and other recent legislation, on state correctional populations. The 
survey includes items on recent changes in the types and numbers of prison beds added with VOI/IIS funds, 
the length of sentences imposed and served, the effects on jail and prison admissions and population 
characteristics, inmate activities and programs, prison staffing and prison opkfations. 
The next page gives a summary of VOI/TIS funding for your state. Please answer the questions on the pages 
that follow as accurately as possible, as they apply in your state. This survey is being mailed to all fifty states 
and to U.S. temtories. Your answers will be analyzed along with responses from other departments of 
corrections. 
Please fax your completed survey form to (301) 918-1900, to the attention of Bob Levinson. If you pEfer to 
mail your response to us, please send the completed form to: 
' I  
American Correctional Association 
Attention: Bob Levinson 
4380 Forbes Blvd 
Lanham MD 20706 
If you have questions about this survey, please call Bob Levinson at (301) 918-1800 x1876. 
YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS 
Name: 
Title: 
Jurisdiction: 
Address: 
Telephone: 
Fax: 
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I. VOYTXS Budgets and Bed Capacity 
Of the total VOI/TIS funds your state has received since 1996, how much has been spent to 
date? 
How many beds of the following types have been added in your state using VOJfTIS funds? (Enter the number of beds in 
the appropriate boxes.) 
Prison 
I 
Minimum security 
Medium security 
Maximum security 
SuperMax facilities 
Leased from private companies 
Other 
Local' 
Jail 
Leased from private companies 
Other 
Other 
Adult Juvenile 
I I 
Total 
I1 
How much of the increase in beds was accomplished by VOVTIS funds Between About Bemeen 
in each of the following ways? None 149% 50% 5149% 100% 
Building new facilities 0 0 0 0 0 
Retrofithg existing institutions 0 lY 0 13 I3 
Expanding capacity in existing institutions 0 0 0 0 0 
Leasing beds from private companies 0 0 0 0 0 
Other CI 0 0 13 0 
11. Sentencing and Time Served 
What is the average prison sentence length imposed today and in 
1993?* 
Length of sentence 
(in months) 
Overall 
Violent offenses 
Property offenses 
Drug offenses 
Other offenses 
What is the prison time actually served today and in 1993?* 
Length of sentence Overall 
(in months) Violent offenses 
Property offenses 
Drug offenses 
Other offenses 
* If 1998 data are not available, use the most recent year for which data are available. 
1 
1993 Expected 1998 
U II 
I1 
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111. VOI/TIS Effects on PrisodJaiI Admissions 
Since 1996 (when VOUTIS funding first became available to your state), what change has occurred in each of the following 
areas, andlhow much of the change do you feel is attributable to VOI/TIS? 
Decreased- 
Substantiallv No Substantially Attributable 
Decreased Change hcreased Increased to voms 
Number of beds available to state corrections 
Minimum security 
Medium security 
Maximum security 
SuperMax facilities 
Leased from private companies 
Other 
Number of beds available to local corrections 
Minimum security 
Medium security 
Maximumsec~ty 
Leased from private companies 
Other 
I 
Prisoners newly admitted 
For violent offenses 
For property offenses 
For drug offenses 
For other offenses 
Adults 
Youths sentenced as adults 
Juveniles 
Males 
Females 
Aged 50 and older 
With drug or alcohol treatment needs 
With physical health problems 
With mentaI health problems 
0 
' I  0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 0 0 0 
13 0 U 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I3 
0 
0 
0 
% 0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
rl 
I3 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 U 0 m 
U 0 D D 
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IV. VOYTIS Effects on Prison Population 
Since 1996 (when VOZETIS funding first became available to your state), what change has O C C U K ~  within the overall 
prison population in each of the following areas, and how much of the change do you fael is attributable to VOmIS? 
Substantially No SubStantidy Attributable 
Increased to voms Decreased Decreased Change Increased 
,% 
% 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 d 
0 0 IO 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
Mala 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 D D 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
Violent offenders 
Property offenders 
Drug offenders 
Other offenders 0 0 0 0 i:: 
,% 
,% 
% 
,% 
,% 
% 
Adults 
Youths sentenced as adults 
Juveniles 
Females 
Offenders aged 50 and older 
Offenders with drug or alcohol treatment needs 
Offenders with physical health problems 0 0 0 0 
-% 0 0 0 0 0 Offenders with mental health problems 
V. VOYTIS Effects on Prison Inmate Activities and Programs 
Since 1996 (when VOI/ITS funding fxst became available to your state), what change has occurred in each of the foilowing 
areas, and how much of the change do you feel is attributable to VOI/TIS? 
Inmates who work regularly 
Inmates being educated regularly 
Inmates with outside recreation (yard 
Inmates with visitation privileges 
Inmate drug treatment programs 
Inmate drug testing 
Inmates who test positive for drug use 
Inmate gang activity 
Inmate appeals 
Inmates housed in secure units 
Inmates double-bunked 
Inmates triple-bunked 
Inmate infractions 
Inmate assaults on staff 
privileges) 
substantially No substantially Attributable 
Decreased Deaeased Change hcreased lnneased to v o m  
0 0 0 0 0 m- 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
D 
0 
0 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
tl 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 
tl 
0 
0 
0 
0 
U 
0 
0 
0 
U 
0 
-70 
?6 
-6 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
D 
U 
U 
D 
I3 
a 
U 
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VI. VOYTIS Effects on Prison Staffing 
Since 1996 (when VOI/TIS funding first became available to your state), what change has occurred in each of the following 
area,  andhow much of the change do you feel is attributable to VOUTIS? 
Number of staff 
Male staff  
Female staff 
Staff qualifications 
Hours worked by staff 
Hours of stafftraining 
security braining 
Physical training 
Other training 
Substantially No 
Decreased Decreased Change 
13 c3 0 
" D 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
c3 0 0 
0 0 0' 
Substantially 
Increased 
U 
0 
CI 
U 
0 
0 
0 
CI 
0 
VII. VOYTIS Effects on Operations 
Since 1996 (when VOVITS funding fmt became available to your state), what change has occurred in each of the f o l l 0 6 ~  
areas, and how much of the change do you feel is attributable to VODTIS? 
Substantially No SUbQUthUY Attributable 
Decreased Decreased C h g e  lnaeased h m  to v o m  
,% 
,% 
,% 
-% 
,% 
,% 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
D I3 0 0 CI 
0 0 0 0 U 
0 0 0 CI 0 
0 c7 U 0 
0 0 0 0 CI 
Use of good timdgain time 
Use of parole 
Post-release supervision (other than parole) 
Inmate classification 
For risk 
For programming needs 
For prison management 
0 % 
WIT. Additional Comments 
Please list any obstacles or issues that have arisen in your state in the implementation of 
VOYTIS: 
- 
What changes in your state's response(s) to VOI/"IS would you like to see? 
- 
- 
Thank you! 
<< You may elaborate your reply to any question >> 
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States Responding to the ACA Survey 
TIS Non- TIS Texas 
Arizona 
California 
Connecticut 
Florida 
I1 1 inoi s 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Mime sot a 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
New York 
North Carolina 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Tennessee 
Utah 
Virginia 
Alabama Texas 
Arkansas 
Colorado 
District of Columbia 
Idaho 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Massachusetts 
Montana 
Ne bras ka 
Nevada 
New Hampshire 
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
Vermont 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Washinqton 
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